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The factors which contribute to the “equity premium puzzle” of aggregate stock market
behavior have been pondered in the academic literature for over 20 years. Typically,
time varying risk aversion and habit based consumption have been posited as keys to
this puzzle. Central to each of these contentions, from a behavioral perspective, is the
concept that risk aversion changes based on circumstance, to the extent that excess risk
premiums are demanded on stock market returns. This research aims to test if models of
this nature have a behavioral basis, through a laboratory experiment in which subjects
are primed in a boom or bust business cycle condition before participating in an experi-
mental closed book call market. I find that individuals exhibit greater risk aversion and
reduced predictive ability in the bust treatment than they do in the boom treatment. In
addition asset market bubbles are significantly reduced in the markets under the bust
condition. These findings lend weight to the notion of habit based countercyclical risk
aversion. Further, they have implications for asset pricing, suggesting that pricing mod-
els may benefit by reflecting collective emotions brought about by states of nature.
Keywords: Behavioural finance, countercyclical risk aversion, experimental asset mar-
kets, financial bubbles.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The factors which contribute to the equity premium puzzle of aggregate stock market
behaviour have been pondered in the academic literature for over 20 years. The equity
premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott, 1985) contends that the average premium com-
manded by equity is abnormally high and this anomaly has given rise to a huge body of
literature (Weil, 1989; Benartzi and Thaler, 1993; Kocherlakota, 1996). The demanded
equity is so high, in fact, that based on standard asset pricing models such as the con-
sumption capital asset pricing model (CCAPM) investors would require a relative risk
aversion factor of 301 for the model to correctly price the market.
Addressing this puzzle is important, given the impact that the success (and failure)
of asset markets can have on the welfare of individuals and economies that depend on
them for the allocative e ciency of wealth. Having an increased understanding of the
mechanics that drive the asset markets will allow individuals and organisations to change
their behaviour to avoid potential negative consequences.
A number of di↵erent explanations for this puzzle have been proposed. It has been
suggested that it is not, in fact, the equity risk premium which is too high, but the risk
free rate which is too low (Mehra and Prescott, 1985; Weil, 1989) or that assets are
priced to include the chance of a rare catastrophic event (Rietz, 1988). Alternatively
Barberis et al. (2001) develops a model in which investors derive utility from consump-
tion and changes in their financial wealth. However, this thesis targets countercyclical
1Most models and theoretical reasoning have this number at around one or two.
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risk preference (Campbell and Cochrane, 1995; Constantinides, 1990; Chou et al., 1992;
Wachter, 2006; Verdelhan, 2010) as a potential key to this puzzle.
Countercyclical risk aversion adds a decidedly behavioural flavour to the utility mod-
els which form the basis of consumption based asset pricing. As the name suggests,
countercyclical risk aversion supposes that agent level risk aversion changes over time in
line with the highs and lows of the business cycle. While a variable risk aversion is at
odds with the concept of constant relative risk aversion, which is a component of many
models of asset pricing, it does provide a sound explanation of why the risk premium
demanded for stock market assets is about 6% too high when compared against the risk
free rate (Campbell, 1999). Countercyclical risk aversion can intuitively be thought of
as adding behavioural factors to the markets through asset prices being derived from
the aggregate risk aversion of the market participants.
Fundamental to countercyclical risk aversion is the concept that representative agents
have a habit level of consumption. Habit is often taken to represent the average level of
consumption of an economy. The agents become more risk averse as consumption moves
towards the level of habit and less risk averse as it moves away2. Suggesting that as
the business cycle moves towards its peak, market participants are less risk averse and
as it moves towards its trough, the participants are more risk averse. Hence the term
countercyclical risk aversion.
Theoretically, time varying risk aversion has been modeled in several ways. Using au-
toregressive conditional hetroskedastic mean (ARCH-M) Chou et al. (1992) creates an
econometric model in which time variance of the stock mean/variance ratio is incor-
porated by way of a Kalman filter. Constantinides (1990) uses a time varying habit,
persistent utility function to propose a solution to the equity premium puzzle. While
Drechsler (2013) models time variance as an ambiguity over the current state of the
fundamentals of an asset. Common to each of these models is that preference for risk
changes given prevailing circumstances.
2The power utility function with habit: E⌃1t=0 
t (Ct Xt)1  
1   . In this equation C represents con-
sumption and X the level of habit.   and   are parameters which represent the level of risk aversion
and the stochastic discount factor respectively.
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Empirical evidence supports the idea of changes in individuals’ risk preferences over
time, in relation to specific events such as business cycles. Guiso et al. (2013) find that
the risk preferences of customers of an Italian bank are di↵erent before and after the
global financial crisis (GFC). While Calvet and Sodini (2014) identify changes in risk
aversion based on projected future earnings in a panel examination of 11,000 Swedish
twins, while Malmendier and Nagel (2009) show that individuals who have lived through
tough economic times are likely to be more risk averse than those who have not.
There is also experimental evidence that risk aversion varies based on specific events.
In an experimental asset market Lejarraga et al. (2016) find that subjects are likely
to show increased risk aversion if they lived through a negative financial event rather
than learning about it from graphs or charts. Kuhnen (2015) finds the subjects framed
with negative information will form pessimistic beliefs about their investment options
and Cohn et al. (2015) identify countercyclical risk aversion in financial professionals
after they are primed in a boom or bust financial situation and identifies emotions, in
particular fear, as the likely cause of the change in behaviour.
The notion that emotions have a central role in risk preference is well established in the
literature. In his book “Beyond Fear and Greed: Understanding Behavioral Finance
and the Psychology of Investing”, Shefrin (2002) identifies emotions, including fear, as
a primary determinant of risk preference and investment choice. Hirshleifer (2001) also
argues that current felt emotions may alter the price at which individuals will purchase
stock and Caplin and Leahy (2001) develop a model in which emotions and anticipation
play a primary role in utility. More recently, Andrade et al. (2015) find that emo-
tions and, in particular, fear are responsible for changing risk aversion in experimental
markets.
This interest in emotions and risk taking has spawned a body of neuro-economic liter-
ature which has begun to investigate the link between risk taking and its underlying
neurological cause and e↵ect. From a neuro-biological perspective Coates and Herbert
(2008) find that testosterone and cortisol 3 in financial professionals are predictors of
3Cortisol is one of the main stress hormones and is released by the adrenal cortex in situations which
are novel, uncertain or uncontrollable. Chronically raised levels of cortisol may increase anxiety and
depression and reduce attention and flexibility of behaviour (Kandasamy et al., 2014).
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profitability and market volatility respectively. They suggest that prolonged high lev-
els of these hormones will lead to a shift in risk preferences. Kandasamy et al. (2014)
experimentally validate part of this suggestion by artificially raise the cortisol levels
of subjects over eight days and find increased levels of risk aversion as cortisol levels
increase. Suggesting a biological basis for time varying risk aversion.
In trying to understand the locus of risk aversion Kuhnen and Knutson (2005) use brain
imaging technology to identify the brain regions which activate prior to risk seeking or
risk aversive mistakes made in financial decision making. They argue that the nucleus
accumbens (NAcc) and the anterior insular work in tandem to moderate risk preference
and that activation of these regions separately will lead to a change in risk aversion.
Following up on their previous work Kuhnen and Knutson (2011a) identify that positive
emotional states are more likely to cause people to take risks, while negative emotions
lead to a loss of confidence and increased risk aversion. In an experimental asset market
Smith et al. (2014) shows that the increasing asset mispricing of a financial bubble
correlates with activity in the NAcc and that activation of the anterior insular anticipates
a switch from risk seeking to risk aversive decision making. The seperate activation
of these two brain regions, they suggest, leads to the irrational feedback loop that
characterises bubbles and crashes in experimental asset markets and in real world stock
markets.
The experimental asset market and the ubiquitous asset price bubbles that form and
crash during its short lived existence is an interesting environment in which to observe
countercyclical risk aversion. Not only can confounding variables be held constant, but
investors and asset price dynamics can be observed over multiple sequential periods. In
addition, this setting also a↵ords the opportunity to observe how inducing risk aversion
influences the experimental market.
Since Smith et al. (1988) first observed the bubble-and-crash mispricing of this type of
experimental market, there have been no fewer than 41 published papers and 20 working
papers using similar types of experiments (Palan, 2013), making them a popular research
paradigm. The set up of the experimental asset market is quite straight forward. It is
usual in these markets for between 9 and 16 subjects to be endowed with an amount of
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experimental cash and one or more dividend paying assets, representing a stock (share).
The stock has a known fundamental value and is traded between the participants, who
can choose to buy or sell. The market usually has a fixed endpoint of between 15 to 30
periods (rounds).
These markets are very interesting as even given their small and artificial nature they
do not hold to standard theories of market e ciency, equilibrium and rational expec-
tation. For this reason they are a mainstay in experimental finance with most of the
research investigating either trader expectations or methods to control the size of the
asset bubbles (Noussair and Tucker, 2016).
Bubble formation in experimental asset markets is robust to many changes in the nature
of the experiment (Smith et al., 1988; Kirchler et al., 2012). While bubbles may be
reduced by changing elements of the market, such as fundamental value (Noussair et al.,
2001; Sto¨ckl et al., 2015), the amount of cash with which to speculate (Bostian et al.,
2005; Ackert et al., 2006a), the market type (Theissen, 2000; Friedman, 1993) or the
introduction of short selling or a futures market (Noussair and Tucker, 2006; Noussair
et al., 2016; Normann et al., 2014; Haruvy and Noussair, 2006), bubbles are often never
eliminated.
Given its perceived outcome in real world asset markets it seems reasonable to hy-
pothesise that countercyclical risk aversion will also occur in an experimental market.
Research in this area has indicated the possibility of countercyclical risk aversion (Cohn
et al., 2015; Guiso et al., 2013; Andrade et al., 2015; Kuhnen, 2015) in one-o↵ deci-
sion making tasks or focused on changing the behaviour of individuals in experimental
markets (Paul et al., 2015; Kuhnen and Knutson, 2011b; Deaves et al., 2008) through tar-
geting emotions. However countercyclical risk aversion has not been directly observed
in an experimental asset market. I therefore propose investigating whether inducing
countercyclical risk aversion in this environment will change the nature of bubbles and
mispricing that regularly occur. To achieve this proposition I will conduct an experiment
with a treatment similar to Cohn et al. (2015), in which countercyclical risk aversion is
induced in subjects through priming them in either a boom or bust market scenario and
observing their trading activities over multiple investment decisions.
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1.1 Key research questions
Several models have been developed which inject an irrational behavioural component
into asset prices. This behaviour accounts for the risk premiums demanded by investors
during di↵erent times in the business cycle. Boom and bust business cycles can have
a detrimental impact on economies and individuals alike, it is therefore important to
understand how they can influence asset pricing. Campbell (1999) argues that any model
that attempts to explain asset market behaviour should include high-risk, time variation
and have a correlation with the current state of the economy. Theories of consumption
based asset pricing that contain countercyclical risk aversion present a possible cause
but it is not clear if individuals collectively exhibit this tendency (Mehra, 2012).
Key Research Question 1. Do individuals collectively exhibit countercyclical risk
aversion in an experimental asset market?
While risk aversion is often observed in financial decision making, the emotional and
neuro-biological mechanism which underlie it are not. There are clear indications that
emotions may drive changes in risk aversion and have an influence on asset markets.
Additional neuro-biological evidence (Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005; Smith et al., 2014;
Coates and Herbert, 2008) suggests that risk and reward are encoded di↵erently in the
brain. If these di↵erent brain areas are not working together to maintain an equilibrium
then risk preferences will change.
Key Research Question 2. Do emotions in general, and fear specifically, influence
risk taking in experimental asset markets? If so, what are the neuro-biological mecha-
nisms which underlie them?
1.2 Main findings and contribution
To answer the above research questions I have conducted an experiment in which groups
of individuals, primed in either a boom or bust market scenario, trade a risky asset
(stock) for a riskless one (cash) in a multi-period asset market. I use priming to alter
the subject’s perception of the amount of their surplus consumption, evoking the “fear
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of recession” which Campbell and Cochrane (1995) believe drives the high risk premium
on assets. In the bust condition I expect this to increase their risk aversion, while in the
boom to decrease it.
Addressing Key Research Question 1, I find that individuals and markets show behaviour
consistent with countercyclical risk aversion. Individuals in the bust condition exhibit
greater risk aversion than those in the boom condition, where the average price of their
bid orders per market is 20.42 compared with 25.55 in the boom. This di↵erence shows
a clear change in risk preferences. There was no di↵erence between treatment groups
of individual self-reports of willingness to take risk, collected at the conclusion of the
sessions, suggesting that the treatment e↵ect was not perceptible to them. There is
strong evidence that individuals are able to more accurately predict the price of the
risky asset in the boom condition than they are in the bust condition. The average
forecast bias4 in the bust is -1.00 while in the boom it is 0.14.
Markets in the bust treatment tended to exhibit a flat price trajectory as compared to
the more bubbly trajectory of the boom treatment. On average, markets in the bust
treatment had a clearing price of 19.12, compared to 23.55 in the boom treatment.
On average markets traded above their fundamental value 70% of the time in the bust
condition and 90% of the time in the boom condition. There is significant evidence
that these mispricings were lower in the bust treatment, indicating that participants
were more inclined to invest in the risky asset around its fundamental value. However
there is no evidence that markets in the bust treatment traded consistently below the
fundamental values. This suggests that the bust treatment increases collective risk
aversion but it does not lower it to the point where the asset consistently trades for less
than it is worth.
Answering Key Research Question 2, I find that self reports of fear, happiness, stimu-
lation and dominance exogenous to the treatment do not have a statistically significant
impact on the price of bid orders placed by individuals. However, their predicted e↵ects
on bids do move in a direction which is consistent with emotions playing a role in risk
aversion. In particular, fear as reported by the individual on a seven level Likert scale,
4The di↵erence between the predicted price and the actual price.
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decreases the amount bid by 5% of the fundamental value of the asset for each level.
This decrease lends weight to the idea that fear based on countercyclical risk aversion
may decrease asset prices.
An additional piece of evidence that emotions are influencing risk aversion is that the
collective level of happiness in a market increases the clearing price of the risky asset.
This finding is in line with other studies of emotion in risk taking, which argue that
happiness and excitement increase risk preference. It is plausible that reward centers
in the brain cause feedback loops which increase mispricing to a point at which risk
aversion drives prices down. This idea is supported by the above observation that in
the bust treatment the averaged di↵erence between price predictions and actual price is
-1.10. This negative bias is statically significant from the boom treatment. Suggesting a
homogeneity of expectations in the boom that is fueling bubbles. In the bust treatment
there is substantially more negative expectation on the part of some participants, which
inhibits the bubbles from forming or constrains them once they do get started.
Countercyclical risk aversion has not been simulated or observed over multiple invest-
ment decisions in an experimental assets market. The findings presented above con-
tribute to two streams of literature. They provide a behavioural basis for, and serve to
lend weight to, theories of asset pricing which use habit and time variable risk prefer-
ences as a part of their model. They also add an additional and unique manner in which
to modify risk aversion and reduce bubbles in experimental asset markets. The study
of these small markets can assist our understanding of real world markets as well as the
theories that underpin them. In doing so they give us additional insight into the very
important notion of market e ciency.
1.3 Thesis outline
Chapter 2 reviews the influential and more recent literature in the area of countercyclical
risk aversion, touching on theoretical work, but focusing on experimental studies that
have been undertaken. This chapter will also review the recent work as it pertains to
experimental asset markets, emotion-based risk aversion and bubbles.
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Chapter 3 covers the design and build of the experimental asset market, including subject
recruitment procedures, market architecture, treatments and controls. Important design
decisions such as market, fundamental value and treatment type are highlighted and their
use supported. The usefulness of the experimental methods in finance and economics is
also discussed briefly.
Chapter 4 states the results of the research and answers the key research questions on
the e↵ect of countercyclical risk aversion on individuals and experimental asset markets.
It also looks at mispricing under the two treatment conditions. Further, it elaborates
on these key findings and other associated, but not directly related, results.
Chapter 5 provides a discussion on the results in relation to similar work in the area and
the implication of the results for countercyclical risk aversion and experimental asset
markets. It also suggests reasons for these findings, discusses limitations of the research
and other possible explanations for the results.
The final chapter concludes the thesis with a summary of findings, the implications of
the research and suggested avenues for future investigation.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
In studying the behavioural basis of countercyclical risk aversion in experimental asset
markets this thesis examines several concepts in behavioural finance and economics.
The first is a time varying risk aversion which has been posited theoretically, observed
empirically and tested experimentally. The second considers the emotions which cause
changes in risk preference and the underlying neuro-biological origins of this behaviour.
While the final is the bubbly nature of the experimental asset market, which is used in
this thesis to test for countercyclical risk aversion. This chapter will review the literature
in each of these areas and provide a summary of earlier work and details of more recent
studies.
2.1 Countercyclical risk aversion and the equity premium
puzzle
In their seminal work Mehra and Prescott (1985) show that using a general equilibrium
model in the real economy exposes a puzzle in the return on assets. This puzzle, basically
stated, contends that the risk premium on stock market assets as compared to the risk
free rate, is too high and that to explain it, an unrealistically high level of individual
risk aversion is required. The problem, they maintain, is that based on a real average
annual consumption growth of two percent, there is only a small elasticity of substitution
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between each year. Using a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)1 the risk premium
required on assets should be 0.35% above the risk free rate. In contrast the di↵erence
between the risk free rate and the return on assets is around 6%. This disparity Mehra
and Prescott (1985) coin as the ”equity premium puzzle”.
In suggesting a solution to this puzzle, Constantinides (1990) proposes a model in which
utility is informed by past, as well as current, consumption. The inclusion of habit in
a utility model, in its simplest form, creates time varying risk aversion. Intuitively this
addition seems reasonable. As the individuals consumption moves towards an internal
or external level of habit, they become more risk adverse. As it moves away from that
level of habit they become less risk adverse as they can consume more. Constantinides
(1990)’s bases habit on the previous periods consumption level (internal habit). How-
ever, Campbell and Cochrane (1995) find that models of this kind can still require a
high consumption risk aversion. To overcome the high consumption they introduce an
external level of consumption which is based on the aggregate consumption (across the
economy) rather than individual previous consumption.
Campbell and Cochrane (1995)’s utility model is presented in Equation 2.1 below:
E⌃1t=0 
t (Ct  Xt)1  
1    (2.1)
In this equation C represents consumption and X the level of habit.   and   are pa-
rameters which represent the level of risk aversion and the stochastic discount factor
respectively. In this model, the higher the  , the more the curvature of the utility func-
tion. They argue that when utility is modeled in such a form it allows for large recession
to occur when consumption is very close to habit under their model of asset pricing. It
is due to this chance of recession that large risk premium is demanded on assets. This
model does have some criticisms2, however Campbell and Cochrane (1995) state that
their primary aim was to produce a representative agent utility that would help explain
aspects of the equity premium puzzle rather than to apply the model to microeconomics
1CRRA, as the name implies, suggests that the level of risk aversion does not change over time.
2Mehra (2012) cites a concern that under their model a “representative agent would experience
substantial welfare gains if 10% of his endowment were periodically destroyed.”
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data. They interpret their findings to mean that a high risk premium is demanded be-
cause individuals are frightened that the stock market may go into a recession during
the contraction phase of the business cycle. While this is not an unreasonable assump-
tion, Mehra (2012) has a concern that it has not been shown that individuals actually
exhibit this behaviour. A number of papers (including this thesis) attempt to address
this concern from a behavioural perspective.
2.2 Behavioural risk aversion
Expected utility theory posits that the representative agent is a rational utility max-
imiser with a constant risk aversion. From a behavioural perspective there is evidence
that individuals do not exhibit these attributes. Investigations into bounded rational-
ity suggests that individuals, due to cognitive, informational and temporal limitations,
are less than fully rational agents. In a survey of others’ work, Conlisk (1996) inves-
tigates the friction between bounded and unbounded rationality. He does not suggest
that models which include unbounded rationality should be discarded, but he does ar-
gue persuasively in favour of the investigation of bounded rationality as a limitation to
human decision making in economics and finance. Due to limited cognition, individuals
will use heuristics or rules of thumb to make decisions rather than process all available
information. In addition, he cites a number of authors who find that individuals do not
appreciate the importance of the temporal discount factor. Bounded rationality lays the
foundation for countercyclical risk aversion due to the use of heuristics and emotions in
determining risk based on the current macroeconomic climate.
To investigate if an individual’s level of risk aversion is influenced by the macroeconomic
events in their life, Malmendier and Nagel (2009) conduct an empirical study using
data from the US Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finance. They conclude that
individuals who have lived through times of high stock market returns are likely to
take more financial risk than those who have lived through low stock market returns.
They also observe that individuals are more likely to use information based on their
lived experiences when making financial decisions rather than incorporating all available
historical data as suggested by rational learning models.
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In a study which specifically tries to identify countercyclical risk aversion and habit
Calvet and Sodini (2014) look at the investment habits of of over 11 000 twins. They
proxy habit as the consumption of households in the individuals’ local area over the
previous three years. Using panel data and controlling for a range of variables, they find
that a higher financial wealth as well as higher expected human capital, increase the
likelihood of investment in risky portfolios. They also find that as consumption moves
towards the level of habit there is a decrease in investment in risky portfolios. This study
indicates that economic circumstances play a clear role in determining an individual’s
level of risk preference.
The bust phase of the business cycle is often associated with hard economic times that
can have life altering consequences. Like a stock market crash, Cameron and Shah
(2015) find natural disasters cause individuals to become more risk adverse, sometimes
for years after the event took place. In an experiment using Indonesian villagers, they
posit that the natural disaster acts as a shock which causes a re-evaluation of how much
risk they are prepared to take. In their experiment, they asked subjects to choose one of
seven gambles which have varying levels of risk. Those who had previously experienced
either flood or earthquake, even if it was many years ago, chose less risky gambles. This
shock of the natural disaster may be similar to the shock of a financial crisis in increasing
risk aversion.
The global financial crisis (GFC) had a lasting impact on individuals and economies.
Using survey questions posed to customers of an Italian bank before and after the GFC,
Guiso et al. (2013) attempt to identify time varying risk aversion in the form of a fluc-
tuation of the equity risk premium. They find that relative risk aversion had increased
after the GFC. So much so that in one of the questions posed only 16% chose a ”low risk
and no return” option, while after the GFC the percentage giving this response went up
to 46%. Due to harmful impact of the GFC hey suggest that emotions and fear may be
the cause of this fluctuation.
Cohn et al. (2015) conduct an experiment to demonstrate how countercyclical risk aver-
sion induced by fear may influence risk preference in financial choice. At a trade fair in
Switzerland, 144 financial professionals were randomly assigned to one of two treatment
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groups in which they were primed in a financial boom or bust through use of question-
ing and fictive market graphs. After identify their current emotional state and provide
demographic details they were asked to undertake two financial investment in which
they could earn up to 500 CHF (US$546). In each of two tasks, one under risk and the
other under ambiguity, subjects were asked to invest a proportion of 100 CHF in either
a risky asset or a risk free asset with no return. The risky asset had two states, either
a loss of 100% of the investment or a gain of 250%. In the risk task subjects knew the
probability of the two outcomes, while in the amiguity task they did not. At the end
of the experiment only 20% of participants (determined by random draw) were awarded
winnings, the remainder received nothing. The two primary findings resulting from this
experiment were that subjects invested significantly less in the risky asset in the bust
treatment as compared to the boom treatment in both the risk and ambiguity task, and
that fear was the primary emotional driver behind this decision. Based on these results
there would seem to be a clear link between countercyclical risk aversion and emotion.
In an experiment linking emotion, risk and biology Lo and Repin (2002) measure the
physiological characteristics of 10 foreign exchange traders during the course of their
trading day. They find that traders exhibit increased emotional responses as trading
increases. However they do not ascribe a type of emotional response, only that there
was one. In a later work Lo et al. (2005) extend these previous findings with a larger
sample of 80 day traders. Using a battery of psychometric testing and a daily emotional
questionnaire they measured trading performance over a 32 day period in July/August
2002. They find that due to their small sample size they are unable to identify the emo-
tions that make a good trader, but they are able to identify that extreme emotions such
as fear and greed are wholey detrimental to successful individual trading performance.
It is worth noting that during the period over which the experiment was conducted the
US S&P500 fell 20% as a remnant of the dot-com crash3.
Kandasamy et al. (2014) propose a physiological basis for events such as the dot-com
3It would be interesting to compare these results with a similar study during a sustained stock
market increase.
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bubble. Based on earlier work by Coates and Herbert (2008)4 they observe that say-
Physiology induced shifts in risk preferences may thus be an unappreciated cause of
market instability. To test this they conduct a double blind placebo controlled trial in
which subjects had either their cortisol levels 5 artificially raise or were given a placebo.
During the eight day period of the experiment the subjects risk preference was measured
using lotteries. They found that the chronic cortisol (raised over the eight days) caused
a marked increase in risk aversion as compared to the placebo group. They conclude
that sustained high levels of cortisol cause subjects to be more risk adverse. This data
supports the conclusions in much of the behavioural risk aversion literature that risk
preference is highly dynamic and based on environmental circumstance.
From a neurological perspective, Kuhnen and Knutson (2005) explore the brain regions
involved in changes in risk preferences. Specifically, they look for signs that the nucleus
accumbens (NAcc) and the anterior insular provide anticipatory warning of risk seeking
or risk aversive mistakes, respectively in financial decision making. Using Behavioural
Investment Allocation Strategy (BIAS) tasks, 19 subjects had to decide between invest-
ing in a riskless bond or one of two risky stocks over 20 trials of 10 blocks each. At the
beginning of each block, one risky stock was assigned to come from a “good” distribu-
tion and the other one a “bad”. The “good” stock had a better chance of a good return
than the “bad” stock. They compare the investment choices of each of each subject to a
utility maximising risk neutral Bayesian updating rational agent and identify when risk
was taken inappropriately and then analysed the brain imaging data. They found that
NAcc activation predicted switching between the riskless bond and the risky stock, and
activation in the anterior insular predicted the opposite. These switches also correlated
with making a risk seeking or risk aversive mistake. This suggests that NAcc predicts
risk seeking behaviour and mistakes, and the anterior insular predicts risk aversive be-
haviour and mistakes, and that excessive activation of one area but not the other may
lead to excessive risk taking or risk aversion as seen in market booms and busts.
4Who identify that there is a positive correlation between morning level of testosterone in professional
traders and their daily profitability and that as market volatility increased so did cortisol levels.
5Cortisol is one of the main stress hormones and is released by the adrenal cortex in situations which
are novel, uncertain or uncontrollable. Chronically raised levels of cortisol may increase anxiety and
depression and reduce attention and flexibility of behaviour Kandasamy et al. (2014).
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Smith et al. (2014) conduct a similar neuro-physiological experiment examining the role
of the NAcc and the interior insular in the bubble and crash of an experimental asset
market. They run 16 experimental markets with an average of 20 participants in each.
In each market 2 to 3 participants have their brain activity measured using functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). The markets exhibit the usual bubble and crash
patterns which are typical of experimental asset markets. Analysing the fMRI output,
they find that NAcc activity tracks price bubbles in the simulated markets as they rise
and eventually crash. In addition they observe that subjects who had the top third
earnings had activity in the anterior insular cortex, which seemed to predict that the
bubble was about to burst. This result indicates that a collective increase in anterior
insular activity of the experiments’ participants induces a collective risk aversion which
causes the market to crash. These findings tie in nicely with those of Kuhnen and
Knutson (2005) above and, taken together, these results suggest a clear role for the
NAcc and the anterior insular in changes in risk preferences.
2.3 The experimental asset market
Smith et al. (1988)’s seminal work on experimental asset markets sets out to explore the
rational expectation model of asset valuation as a foundation for Fama (1970)’s work on
the e cient market hypothesis (EMH). They contend that in the absence of news the
price of an asset should remain constant once common dividend expectations have been
formed amongst the market participants. Over 27 experimental sessions they identify
that common knowledge of a dividend does not induce common expectations and that
bubbles form and then crash, but experience diminishes the size of the bubbles. They
also find that forecasts of future prices under-predict during the boom periods and over-
predict during the bust periods of the market. Furthermore they cite either expectation
of capital gains (speculation) or misunderstanding of the market as the most likely cause
for the price bubbles. This paper has been hugely influential and led to a large body
of research in the area of experimental asset markets. Many of the papers that have
been spawned by Smith et al. (1988)’s work look to understand the experimental asset
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market bubble through the changes to the fundamental value of the asset or the market
micro-structure.
Plott and Sunder (1982) create an experiment asset market to examine information
e ciency and the e cacy of rational expectation models. Their experimental design
provided for information to be disseminated through some subjects knowing the state
of nature in the next round and some subjects not knowing. The number of sessions
they conducted is small (only 5). However they conclude that the rational expectations
model performs well in that “market mechanism” allowed those with insider knowledge
to convey price information to those who did not have it. Their research leaves what
those market mechanisms were to others and it is these mechanisms which I now turn
to.
Asset fundamental value
The way in which fundamental value influences experimental asset markets has been
investigated by a number of researchers. In asset market experiments the fundamental
value is often the only information that subjects have to determine asset price. In a
study to understand if a constant fundamental value reduces asset mispricing, Noussair
et al. (2001) find that having a constant fundamental value does not remove bubbles
but it does reduce the mispricing. This finding is at odds with Sto¨ckl et al. (2015) who
vary the fundamental value regime in an experiment consisting of 30 market sessions.
They use treatments of constant, increasing, decreasing and stochastic fundamental
values. They do not find bubbles in the market with a constant fundamental value but
do find pricing e ciency. They find overvaluation and undervaluation in markets with
decreasing and increasing fundamental values respectively. Markets with a stochastic
fundamental value behaved as per the increasing and decreasing treatments based on
the predominant direction of their prices. The disparity between Noussair et al. (2001)
and Sto¨ckl et al. (2015) may be based on the experimental methodology or market
mechanism used. The eight sessions of the former experiment were conducted over a
three year period during which time there was an economic shock, which may have
impacted the subjects to perceive risk di↵erently.
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Bostian et al. (2005) also set a constant fundamental value but they vary the amount of
cash that is available to with which to speculate. They find that prices bubble signifi-
cantly when there is more cash available to the subjects. In the the low cash treatment
mispricing usually tracks above the fundamental value as opposed to generating smaller
bubbles. This lends weight to the notion that subjects better understand what the as-
set price should be in constant fundamental value markets and speculation rather then
confusion is causing the markets to bubble in the high cash treatment.
To investigate if confusion causes mispricing in markets with declining fundamental val-
ues Kirchler et al. (2012) conduct an experiment asset market. They use a questionnaire
at the end of the market which has either constant or declining fundamental value to
determine if the subjects had a solid understanding of what they were doing. Subjects in
the declining fundamental value treatments indicated that they expected the fundamen-
tal value to stay constant rather than decreasing and were therefore confused on what
the price of the asset should be. However in their experiment they do not provide a
visual representation to explain declining fundamental values to the participants. Many
asset market experiments do this explain this as it aids understanding on the part of the
subjects. Also, the constant fundamental value pays either -5 or 5 with equal likelihood.
It could be that seeing a negative dividend 50% of the time is causing a negative frame,
which is increasing risk aversion (see Kuhnen (2015)).
Market micro-structure
The design of the experimental asset market plays an important part in ensuring the
robustness of results. A number of papers look at market micro-structure in terms of
trading mechanism design, and rules and setup of the market. Carlin et al. (2013) find
that the more complex the asset the greater the increase in price volatility. While Theis-
sen (2000) compares closed book call, continuous double auction and dealer markets, and
finds that the closed book call market and the continuous double auction market have
better price e ciency than the dealer market.
In an interesting departure from the usual experimental asset market methodology,
Arifovic and Ledyard (2007) design an experiment in which they test the e ciency
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of open and closed book call markets using computerised and human subjects. In both
cases they find the closed book call market to be more price e cient.
Friedman (1993) looks at trading e ciency and trading volume across the continuous
double auction and call markets. He finds that the double auction market provides
slightly better asset allocations, but the same informational e ciency, as the call market.
The call market provided greater depth through a greatly reduced maximum bid ask
spread. In contrast to theoretical analysis, he also finds that the clearing house tracks
fundamentals ”exceedingly” well.
Market attributes
In an influential paper on the inclusion of short selling in experimental asset markets
Haruvy and Noussair (2006) find that the addition of short selling does not eliminate the
individual trader behaviours that cause mispricing. Indeed they find that these markets
tend to misprice below the fundamental value, which they note is at odds with Ackert
et al. (2006b) who find the opposite. They put this down to di↵erences in the asset
market design based on the inclusion of a second asset which may induce subjects to
short in one market to obtain cash to go long in another. However this explanation
seems counter intuitive as it would potentially drive prices below the fundamental value
rather than have them track them.
Noussair and Tucker (2006) conduct an experimental asset market with a spot and a
futures market. They find in their experiment that the price closely tracks the funda-
mentals and that price bubbles do not occur. They conclude that the futures market
gives them something else to do which reduces speculation and that it gives a sense of
homogeneity in regard to price expectation. While the findings are very interesting, it
should be noted that only four sessions were conducted with only 12 traders in each.
However they do tally with the active participation hypothesis which suggests that there
is excess trading because there is nothing else to do and that mispricing would be reduced
if they had other tasks.
In a clear test of Smith et al. (1988)’s ”speculative hypothesis”, Lei et al. (2001) create
an experimental asset market in which it is not possible to speculate. They posit that
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while speculation may explain all or part of the cause for experimental asset market
bubbles it is not necessary for the market to bubble. Based on this result they maintain
that it is irrationality that causes mispricing rather than the lack of common knowledge
of rationality. They also examine the active participation hypothesis and observe that
although mispricing is lower when subjects have another activity, it still exists.
The idea that individuals are more risk seeking after prior gains is often referred to as
the “house money” e↵ect. Ackert et al. (2006a) conduct an experiment to observe if
this e↵ect occurs in experimental asset markets. Subjects are endowed with either a
large or a small amount of money with which to trade in an experimental asset market.
They found that individuals and markets in the low money treatment group o↵ered
lower bids and consequently had lower asset prices. Their experiment lends weight to
Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008)’s study of household data that finds that greater wealth
leads to greater stock market participation. However this finding does seem to contradict
the findings of Bostian et al. (2005) above, whose markets did not misprice at all in the
low cash treatment. The most likely explanation for this is that Bostian et al. (2005)
had a constant fundamental value, which reduced confusion on the part of the traders.
Haruvy et al. (2007) investigate if optimism or pessimism in asset price predictions
inform the actual price of an asset. They operate a closed book call market in which
participants traded a single dividend paying asset. As did Smith et al. (1988), they
elicit price predictions from their participants, but instead of just one period in advance
they elicit price predictions for every subsequent remaining round. Each market had
15 periods, so in the first round they made 15 predictions, in the second they made
14 predictions, in the third they made 13 predictions, and so on. They find that in
inexperienced traders, predictions are based on a continuation of the past trend. They
conjecture that as traders gain more experience they optimise their trading behaviour to
try and anticipate the peak of the market, and in doing so reduce the size of the bubble.
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2.4 Emotions and experimental asset markets
In an experimental asset market Deaves et al. (2008) study if overconfidence and/or
gender influence individual orders or asset prices. They find that greater overconfidence
leads to greater trading activity and causes the overconfident trader to trade at unprof-
itable prices. They also conclude that females are no less overconfident than men and
that in general females are more risk adverse than males.
From a di↵erent emotional perspective Andrade et al. (2015) undertake an asset market
experiment to investigate if positive excitement, brought about by happiness, causes
bigger price bubbles than negative excitement, caused by fear or sadness. They find
that the average price of their 48 markets is higher in the positive excitement treatment,
and tracks at around the same level in the negative excitement and neutral treatments.
This finding provides a clear indication that excitement decreases risk aversion.
In a study which confirms the findings of the Deaves et al. (2008)’s and Andrade et al.
(2015)’s experiments, Kuhnen and Knutson (2011b) argue that emotional excitement
increases risk preference through increased confidence in the individuals’ ability to make
decisions. In their experiment, participants were primed with either a positive, negative
or neutral image. They were then asked to invest in either a risky or riskless asset.
Priming and investment decisions were repeated 90 times. Their results indicate that
those in the positive prime were more likely to choose the risky asset and those in the
negative prime were more likely to choose the riskless one. They also find that the
positive prime increased the participants confidence that they were able to evaluate the
risky investment.
In contrast to Deaves et al. (2008), Eckel and Fu¨llbrunn (2015) find that males produce
higher bubbles in experimental asset markets. They run 12 markets, each with nine
exclusively male or female participants. In all female markets they observe a number
of negative as well as smaller bubbles overall. They also find that females make lower
price predictions at the beginning of the market and conclude that they have lower price
expectation.
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A number of studies have investigated how experience abates experimental stock mar-
ket bubbles. In their original experiments Smith et al. (1988) cite that only experience
causes experimental asset markets to track their fundamentals. While Dufwenberg et al.
(2005) specifically test for how much experience is necessary to reduce or eliminate bub-
bles. They find that markets that contain as few as 1/3 of participants with experimental
asset market experience cause a significant reduction or elimination. Huber et al. (2016)
find that both the positive (having gained money) and negative (having lost money)
prior experience in an experimental asset market leads to smaller price bubbles. How-
ever this finding directly contradicts Lejarraga et al. (2016), who find that individuals
who have a negative market learning experience are more risk adverse than those who
have a positive one. The di↵erence between these two findings is most likely down to
methodology. Lejarraga et al. (2016) use a continuously fictive market in which they
control the payout of the risky asset and simulate booms and busts, and measure risk
aversion. Whereas Huber et al. (2016) created a typical Smith et al. (1988) market and
allowed the participants to learn about fundamental values in a positive or negative way
and measured the bubbles that arose.
2.5 Conclusion
The research reviewed above, which informs the investigation carried out in this thesis,
examines the nature of financial decision making under risk. Models of asset pricing have
included countercyclical risk aversion, adding a behavioral dimension which introduces
a utility function containing time varying risk aversion. Empirical work in the area of
time varying risk preference has underscored the relevance of the intuition, that when
times are bad individuals are more risk adverse while experimental evidence indicates
that risk aversion is changeable and that emotions seem to be the basis for these changes.
The setup and design of an experimental asset market for the purposes of examining
countercyclical risk aversion is detailed in the next chapter. Previous studies have not
investigated the impact of countercyclical risk aversion in long lived experimental asset
markets. Consequently this chapter has also reviewed the studies undertaken in the area
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of experimental markets to better understand the nature of these environments which
are prone to speculative and irrational mispricing.
Chapter 3
Data collection and experimental
setup
Data for this research was collected via a lab based experiment in which participants
traded in an experimental asset market using software developed under the oTree soft-
ware framework (Chen et al., 2016). This chapter will detail the experimental sessions
that were run, the nature of the participants and the mechanisms that were used to cap-
ture data. In addition, the design decisions taken in the creation of the market will be
discussed and justified through the findings of supporting literature. At the end of the
chapter there will be a brief discussion on use of experiments in finance and economics.
3.1 The experiment
The intent of this experiment is to observe countercyclical risk aversion in individuals
and its e↵ect on experimental asset markets. 157 subjects were recruited via the ORSEE
system (Greiner et al., 2004) from the student population at Queensland University of
Technology. Selection was open to undergraduates and postgraduates and there was
no restriction on the primary area of study of the students. Knowledge of finance or
financial markets was not a prerequisite for participation but nor was it proscribed.
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Ten experimental sessions were conducted between 23 September 2016 and 24 October
2016 in the Queensland Behavioural Economics (QuBE) lab at Queensland University
of Technology, Gardens Point campus, with each session typically lasting between 90
and 120 minutes. The QuBE lab is a controlled environment and contains 20 personal
computers on which the experiment was run. Each computer was screened so subjects
were unable to view the activities of others. After signing a consent form, subjects were
asked to read written instructions1 on the use of the trading software and were given a
short presentation by the experimenter on the same. Subjects were informed that they
could not use their mobile phones nor communicate with any of the other participants in
the room and that any questions that they had would be answered by the experimenter
at their desk.
After using self-reports to rate their current emotional state and completing a cognitive
reflection test, subjects were treated by priming them in either a “boom” or “bust”
market scenario. After two practice rounds they attempted to earn money by trading
in a closed book call market over 30 periods. There were two markets in each session.
Cash and stock holdings were initialised to starting values at the beginning of the prac-
tice round and each market. Trade occurred between participants and, apart from an
initial endowment of 100.00 experimental currency units (ECU) in cash and six shares,
participants earned money from the interest on cash holdings and the dividends from
share holdings. They also earned money if they sold the shares above, or bought them
below, the fundamental value of the stock or if they sold above the price at which they
bought a particular share. In addition, subjects were asked to predict the closing price
of the share in the next two periods.
Each subject was paid an AUD5.00 show up fee in addition to any task related payment
made as a part of the experiment. They were also awarded AUD0.09 for each prediction
which was within 10% of the clearing price of the relevant period. At the end of the
experiment participants were paid the earnings from one of the markets 2 in the session
at the exchange rate of ECU1.00/AUD0.03. The total average payment for each subject
1See Appendix A for the instructions presented to the subjects.
2To induce the players to trade in each market as if it was a one shot session the subjects were
informed that payment for the session will be made for one market selected at random.
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Instructions
Emotional self reports
Cognitive reflection test
Treatment
Two practice periods
Market 1 - 30 periods of trading
Market 1 Results
Market 2 - 30 periods of trading
Market 2 results
Payment screen
Demographics
Figure 3.1: Experimental flow. This diagram provides the basic flow of the software
in the experiment. Each box represents one or more screens that participants saw
during the course of the experiment. Appendix A provides a full list of the screens the
participants viewed. Emotional self reports consisted of four di↵erent screens as did
the markets. The market screens are described in detail below.
was AUD32.00. Figure 3.1 provides the flow of screens that the subjects saw as part of
the experiment.
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3.2 Data collection mechanisms
Participants in experimental asset markets often do not understand the market mecha-
nisms and their attributes, such as fundamental value. Consequently, the design of this
experiment and the structure of the returns on assets are designed to be simple and eas-
ily understandable for the average person. To avoid confusion, a closed book call market
is used and the stock being traded has a constant fundamental value. Additionally there
are no time limits placed on the subjects during trading to allow then to think carefully
about their decisions.
Period clearing price, bid/ask price and price predictions are the main data collected as
a part of this experiment. Emotional and demographic data is collected to be used as a
part of the analysis and for control purposes. Self reports of emotions and the answers
to three cognitive reflection test questions are collected before the treatment is applied,
while demographics are gathered at the end of the session.
Emotional self reports
One of the key research questions of this thesis is to understand the role of emotions in
influencing risk preference. To do this a mechanism is needed to capture the emotional
state of the participants. Subjects were asked to rate their current emotional states of
dominance, happiness and stimulation using a self assessment mannequin (SAM). These
SAMs are depicted in Figure 3.2. Emotional self reports are an often used method of cap-
turing the feelings of participants in the experimental setting, as they give participants
a visual anchor to help asses their own feelings (Bradley and Lang, 1994).
According to Bradley and Lang (1994), this method of capturing emotional e↵ect pro-
vides a simple, quick, inexpensive and e↵ective method of measuring individual emo-
tions. On the computer, subjects use a slider with seven positions to capture their level
of emotion based on the mannequin in each frame. This non-verbal method of capturing
emotion is particularly useful for statistical measurement as it captures interval rather
than nominal scale data. From the perspective of economics and finance, SAMs have
been used by Andrade et al. (2015) to check excitement in an asset market experiment,
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Figure 3.2: The self assessment mannequins (SAMs) (Bradley and Lang, 1994) allow
individuals to provide a report on their emotions using a non-verbal pictorial technique
which is cheap and quick to implement. SAMs for domiance, valance and stimulation
are shown top to bottom.
by Schlo¨sser et al. (2013) to measure emotion in economic decision making and by Cohn
et al. (2015) as a method of emotional self reporting in their experiment on risk aversion
with financial professionals. Subjects are also asked to rate how anxious or afraid they
were feeling on a five point Likert scale (Bosman and Van Winden, 2002).
Cognitive reflection test
Participants were asked to complete a cognitive reflection test (CRT) to capture their
willingness to reflect on a logical problem. This device is useful as a control in statistical
measurement and as a variable of interest in its own right, given its correlation with
emotive decision making (Frederick, 2005).
Developed by Frederick (2005), the CRT asks three logic questions which have an intu-
itive but incorrect answer and a correct answer which requires reflection on the question
to answer correctly. The questions are:
• A bat and ball cost 22 dollars in total. The bat costs 20 dollars more than the
ball, how much does the ball cost?
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• It takes five machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets. How many minutes would it
take 100 machines to make 100 widgets?
• In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it
take 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how many days would it take
the patch to cover half of the lake?
The intuitive but incorrect answers for these questions are 2, 100 and 24 respectively.
But with some reflection on the questions it will be clear that the correct answers are
1, 5 and 47.
The CRT is useful on two levels. First, it can be used as a control variable in statistical
analysis in the same way that demographic data is controlled. Frederick (2005) suggests
that individuals with higher CRT scores are less likely to act impulsively to receiving
an immediate monetary reward, thereby have a better appreciation for the time value
of money. Inductively this finding would suggest that individuals with a high CRT
would have a better understanding of fundamental value and its implications in the
stock market games. If this logic is correct, then it should be controlled for in statistical
analysis.
Secondly, di↵erences in decisions and outcomes may be observed in individuals with high
and low CRT scores. Noussair et al. (2016) observe that low CRT indicate an increased
likelihood in the decision to invest in the risky asset when it is above its fundamental
value, and Hoppe and Kusterer (2011) report a low CRT leads to an inclination towards
behavioural biases such as overconfidence and the endowment e↵ect. Consequently it is
a useful metric to test against the treatment, which is expected to induce an emotive
response, in this experiment.
Treatments
As is usual in the experimental method, subjects are randomised into groups and each
group receives a di↵erent treatment. The treatment in this experiment is priming in
either a market expansion (boom) or a market contraction (bust) scenario. Treatment
is administered on a per session basis. That is, all subjects in a particular session receive
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the same treatment. Priming is achieved through the presentation of a fictive market
chart representing either a boom or a bust (Figure 3.3) and asking participants to answer
a number of questions on how they would act in this particular type of market (Cohn
et al., 2015).
Figure 3.3: Boom/Bust treatments were used to prime the subject with either the
concept of an economic boom or bust. As per Cohn et al. (2015) the graphs are not
labeled so as not to represent a specific stock market event in the minds of the subjects,
but instead a general increase or decrease in the economy. The same five questions
were asked in relation to the chart in both treatments: Would it be easy or hard to get
a job?; Would you invest in the stock market?; Is this type of market good or bad for
the economy?; Is it a good time to spend or save?; and, Would you expect to get a pay
rise?
The objective of this priming is to create a disposition within the individual that is
representative of what they would be feeling if they were actually trading in a macro-
economic environment of either an economic expansion or contraction. This type of
priming is similar to framing, however in framing the frame is achieved based on a
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question being asked in either a positive or negative way. Priming has been used in
financial and economic experiments such as Gilad and Kliger (2008), Cohn et al. (2015),
Burnham et al. (2000) and Israel et al. (2014).
Part of the reason for using the boom/bust priming is to activate a feeling of high or
low surplus consumption ratio3 in the subjects. Surplus consumption is the part of the
habit utility models (see Equation 2.1) which informs an individual how close to the
average level of consumption they are. In the case of the boom prime, it is anticipated
that showing them the fictive graph of upward market trend and having them answer
questions about the boom market would give them the feeling that they have a large
amount of surplus consumption and, consequently, a lot of spare cash to invest in the
risky asset. While showing them the market downturn graph and having them answer
questions about a crashing market will give them the feeling that they have very little
surplus consumption and therefore little cash to risk investing. In both cases evoking
an emotive response.
The experimental asset market
The main mechanism of data capture in this experiment is a 30 period closed book call
market in which participants trade a risky asset for cash. Each trader is endowed with
six shares of stock and ECU100.00 in cash. The share is a risky asset and pays a dividend
of either ECU1.00 or ECU0.40 per period with equal likelihood, for an expected return
of ECU0.70. All participants are aware of the return on cash and shares, and that shares
held at the end of the market would be traded in for ECU 14.00 to form part of the end
of market cash holdings.
In each market four screens were presented every period. The first screen was the order
placement screen, shown in Figure 3.4. Traders are able to buy (bid), sell (ask) or hold
(do nothing) each period. If the subjects chose to buy or sell they selected one of the
five prices on the screen. Only one share of stock could be transacted during each period
by each player. They could buy or sell, but not both. The prices that subjects could
3As per the habit utility models where surplus consumption is S ⌘ (Ct Xt)C in which C is consumption
and X is habit.
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Figure 3.4: Order placement. The Order Screen is the main screen used for trading.
Participants could buy or sell stock if they had enough cash or stock to do so. Leverage
and short selling was not permitted. The graph at the bottom of the screen provides a
visual indication of the price of the stock in previous rounds.
buy or sell at were the current share price (which started at ECU 14.00), five and ten
percent above the current share price, and five and ten percent below the current share
price.
Once all orders have been placed for the round, the market clearing price for the share
is established by finding the intersection of demand curve (bids ranked high to low) and
the supply curve (asks ranked low to high). This intersection is the price at which the
most orders could be matched. All bids higher than the clearing price were matched
with asks lower than the clearing price. In cases where there was an unequal number of
bids and asks, those which were matched were chosen at random. A similar mechanism
is used in Van Boening et al. (1993), Friedman (1993), Smith et al. (2014) and Haruvy
et al. (2007).
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Figure 3.5: Trading period results. The Results screen indicates if a purchase or sale
was successful along with the total number of transactions in the period.
Figure 3.6: Dividend and interest. The Dividend and Interest screen provides the
traders with the returns on cash and shares for the period. It also gives them the state
of nature for the share dividend.
The results screen, shown in Figure 3.5, informs the subject if their bid or ask had been
successful and the price at which they had bought or sold, as well as the number of
transactions that occurred. As subjects are trading amongst each other, the maximum
number of transactions that could occur was half the number of participants. That is,
for a bid to be transacted there must be a corresponding ask that was matched to it.
The dividend and interest screen, Figure 3.6, informs the subjects of their dividend and
interest payments.
The price prediction screen, Figure 3.7, asks the participant to forecast the price of the
share at the end of the next round and at the end of the round after that. Subjects were
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Figure 3.7: Price forecasts. The Prediction screen asks the subjects to perdict the
clearing price in the subsequent two rounds.
aware that they would earn money for correctly predicting, within 10%, the clearing
price of the risky asset for each of the following two rounds.
Demographics
Demographic information was collected at the end of each session. The study of indi-
vidual behaviours is integral to the paper and therefore it is necessary to capture and
control for demographics in statistical analysis. In addition this data may have its own
causality outside the treatment e↵ect (Bardsley et al., 2009).
3.3 Bubble reduction strategies
Experimental asset markets are renowned for their bubbly nature and the extent of
mispricing of the asset. The primary cause of these bubbles is usually thought to be
either speculation or confusion on the part of the participants (Smith et al., 1988).
To reduce confusion this experiment is designed using a closed book call market, an
asset which has constant and known fundamental value, and no time limit on trading
decisions.
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Closed book call market
The nature of the asset market used in this experiment is di↵erent to the one used in the
seminal work of Smith et al. (1988) and many subsequent asset market experiments in
the literature. The closed book call market provides a useful mechanism to observe risk
aversion over multiple periods as it benefits from uniform trading prices in the period,
and lacks the immediacy of an open book double auction market which may lead to
excitement on the part of the traders (Arifovic and Ledyard, 2007). Friedman (1993)
finds that information e ciency of the market is at least as good as a continuous double
auction market and, while the closed book call market is cognitively more demanding, it
increases the amount of trades in an illiquid market (Biais et al., 2005). This finding is
important since in this experiment there are 16 traders per market. It is expected that
using a closed book call market will reduce bubbles but not eliminate them (Van Boening
et al., 1993).
Constant and known fundamental value
The fundamental value of the risky asset in this experiment is ECU14.00. This value is
based on a static expected return of 0.70 per round, a risk free rate of 5% (.7/.05 = 14)
and a redemption value at the end of the 30 rounds of ECU14.00. The subjects have
symmetric public information on the return on cash and the dividend payments on the
stock. They can easily calculate the fundamental value based on the risk free rate and
the expected return on the risky asset4.
Many asset market experiments in the literature use either a variable or decreasing fun-
damental value of the asset. However, a number of authors (Kirchler et al., 2012; Huber
and Kirchler, 2012; Biais et al., 2005) find that the changing fundamental value causes
confusion amongst market participants and leads to larger bubbles. In an examination
of di↵erent fundamental value regimes, Sto¨ckl et al. (2010) find that a constant funda-
mental value increases the pricing e ciency in experimental asset markets. Although
4As this experiment was open to participants other than finance majors, it is highly possible that
they would not have the experience or knowledge to calculate fundamental value. To assist with an
intuition on the fundamental value, starting price and the midpoint for the range of prices that the
share could be traded at was set to ECU14.00. It was also common knowledge by the participants that
the share would be traded in at the last round for ECU14.00.
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subjects are not explicitly told the fundamental value of the stock they could certainly
infer it from the starting and redemption value of the stock, or calculate it from the
expected return and the risk free rate. On this basis, the use of a constant fundamental
value is considered an e↵ective measure in reducing the noise trading associated with an
experimental asset market.
No time limit
A majority of experiments using an experimental asset market impose a limit on the
amount of time a subject has to make an investment decision. Friedman (1993) sets a
sixty second limit; Smith et al. (2014) gives 2 seconds as each of one of five prices is
displayed on the screen. In this experiment there is no prohibition on the amount of
time that a subject can take to decide whether or not to invest in the risky asset. This
design decision was taken to reduce bubbles. Andrade et al. (2015) identify excitement,
which triggers positive emotions, as a key element in asset over-valuation. While Kocher
and Sutter (2006) find that individuals making economic and financial decisions under
time pressure make significantly worse decisions, which may well cause decision errors
that Smith et al. (1988) argues leads to bubbles. Therefore, to reduce excitement and
decision errors, there are no time limits in this close book call market5,6.
3.4 The experimental setting
The primary aim of this thesis is to observe if countercyclical risk aversion causes a
change in risk preference. To do so, a measure of the extent to which an individual
is willing to take risk is required (Charness et al., 2013). While this research could be
achieved through the use of actual market data or surveys, the behaviour of individuals
during market booms and bust is a↵ected by a multitude of factors, many of which
would be di cult if not impossible to measure (Cohn et al., 2015). Consequently this
5Based on anecdotal observation each period of the market took on average 2 minutes to complete
6The disadvantage of this approach is the sessions could sometimes run over the allotted time. In
one case one of the markets had to be abandoned because two of the subjects were taking around 5
minutes on average to complete a round and we ran out of time.
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research uses the experimental setting to establish cause and e↵ect through manipu-
lating risk aversion and holding other variables, such as environment and individual
di↵erences constant. This control is achieved through using a lab setting, randomly
selecting participants and controlling demographic data in statistical analysis.
In this experiment a relatively simple method of risk elicitation is used. Participants
choose how much to invest in a riskless and a risky asset over multiple sequential pe-
riods.7. As noted in the literature review, the use of the experimental asset market as
a research setting is very popular for assisting to understand research questions about
individual behaviour, trader characteristics, trader expectations, market structure and
market behaviour (Palan, 2013).
Much is known about the attributes of experimental asset markets which may influence
trading. Consequently attributes such as market micro-structure, the arrival of news
and the fundamental value of an asset, which are likely to influence how individuals and
the market react to treatments, can be controlled (Noussair and Tucker, 2013) to reduce
noise in the market. The ability to control the environment in which data is gathered
provides a strong foundation for data analysis, however the experimental setting in
finance and economics is not without its critics.
Three areas of criticism about financial and economic experiments are often cited: the
external validity of experiments, the use of students as a representative sample and task
related incentives. Both Levitt and List (2007) and Loewenstein (1999) argue strongly
that economic lab based experiments do not produce results which can be generalised
to a real world setting. Stated another way, they believe they have limited external
validity. However Camerer (2011) maintains that concerns about the external validity
of economic experiments are exaggerated as typical experiments do not have a target for
external validity and that their main aim is to understand how behaviour is generally
influenced. Additionally, it stands to reason that if a model is robust enough to work
in a complicated real life market setting then its modelling ability should be able to be
7One of the strengths of observing countercyclical risk aversion in an experimental asset market is
that it can be observed over multiple sequential periods. This strength is also one of its weaknesses, in
that individual observations of risk aversion per participant are not independent. There is an almost
certain likelihood that they will be influenced by decisions and the price of the asset in the previous
rounds. Statistically, this dependence can of course be catered for by correcting the standard errors for
clustering at the market level. This does somewhat weaken the power of the observation.
Chapter 3 38
tested in the simpler controlled setting (Forsythe et al., 1982; Cox and Harrison, 2008).
An alternate way to view these arguments is that experimental economics may not have
high external validity, but this lack of validity is not the main aim of the paradigm;
The use of the experimental setting enables behaviour to be analysed so as to provide a
compliment to field, econometric and theoretical research (Al-Ubaydli and List, 2013).
Secondly, concerns are also raised about the representativeness of students used in these
experiments (Levitt and List, 2007). Students are often used in research as it is con-
venient to use them. It can be argued that a non-connivance sample would not be any
more representative (Bardsley et al., 2009). More fundamentally though, the primary
aim of this research is to test if habit as a part of a consumption based utility function
has a behavioural basis. Camerer (2011) argues that if a model is general enough, which
does not specifically preclude one type of person, then it is valid to test the hypothesis
using students.
Additional evidence on these points is provided by several studies show that results
can be homogeneous across di↵erent groups. In their original asset market experiment
Smith et al. (1988) conduct two markets which used professionals. Each of these markets
bubbled and, in fact, one produced the highest closing price of any of their 27 sessions.
It is also worth noting the findings of Gilad and Kliger (2008) who find that priming
the risk attitudes (used in this experiment) a↵ected financial professionals more than
it did students in making financial decisions. In addition, Cipriani and Guarino (2009)
find that instances of ”herding” in experimental financial markets is consistent between
students and financial professionals.
Finally, the use of task related incentives has been a cause for concern due to it acting
as a confounding variable. At the end of the session participants were paid the AUD5.00
show up fee as well as a task related incentive of 3% of the money they made in one
of the experimental markets in the session chosen at random. As noted in Bardsley
et al. (2009), the turn-up fee is generally regarded as having no impact on behaviour in
the task, however trading payment is contentious. In defence of task related incentives,
Burke et al. (2010) found that the use of reward ensured that subjects considered their
trading activity more carefully. As an asset market is being simulated, the use of task
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related incentives would seem appropriate, if not necessary, to achieve responses similar
to those of real market participants (Duxbury, 1995). The inclusion of a task related
incentive is standard in these types of experiments and is standardized for both treatment
conditions, therefore if it is causing an impact it e↵ecting both treatment groups equally.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter has presented the setup and design of an experimental asset market con-
structed to examine the impact of countercyclical risk aversion on the risk preferences
of individuals and on the market itself. The design of the experiment enables emotions
exogenous to the market to be captured and assessed as an additional factor in driv-
ing risk preference. Based on the findings from previous papers on experimental asset
markets, this market is architected to minimise mispricing so as to better observe risk
aversion.
Chapter 4
Results
This chapter details the results and findings from the experimental asset markets that
were described in Chapter 3. These experiments were undertaken to answer the key
research questions of this thesis:
Key Research Question 1. Do individuals collectively exhibit countercyclical risk
aversion in an experimental asset market?
Key Research Question 2. Do emotions in general, and fear specifically, influence
risk taking in experimental asset markets? If so, what are the neuro-biological mecha-
nisms which underlie them?
4.1 Results summary
Initially Section 4.2 presents descriptive statistics of the data along with clearing price
trajectories for each market. These demographics are generally split evenly between the
two treatment groups and a statistical check indicates randomisation across treatments.
As expected, market clearing prices in the bust tend to follow a generally flat trajectory
around the fundamental value while they appear more bubbly in boom1 condition.
1In the context of of this experiment a boom only refers to the name of the stock market expansion
treatment and should not be confused with the notion of an experimental asset market bubble. While
the two concepts are similar it needs to be clear that the boom treatment is designed to evoke a change
in individual risk aversion, while a bubble is a standard term in asset market experiments which denotes
an asset price which rises above its fundamental value and moves back towards that value as the market
nears its end.
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Section 4.3 statistically analyses (a) the di↵erence in clearing price, and (b) mispricing
measures between the two treatment conditions, and finds that there is evidence of
countercyclical risk aversion in these experimental asset markets. Visually, clearing
price data confirms the intuition that collectively, experimental markets will behave
more conservatively in the bust treatment. The lower asset price of these markets is
supported statistically with non-parametric evidence of a di↵erence in average clearing
prices between the two treatment groups. Parametric ordinary leased squares (OLS)
and panel analysis also provide statistical support for a lower clearing price. Therefore
it is not surprising that di↵erences in mispricing measures, which consider the extent
and duration of di↵erences between prices and fundamental value, are reduced in the
bust condition.
Section 4.4 considers if individuals exhibit greater risk aversion in an economic bust than
they do in a boom and what, if any, emotions or individual di↵erences play a role in this
change in risk preference. Non-parametric statistical analysis reveals that individuals in
the boom condition are more likely to display decreased risk aversion than those in the
bust condition. OLS analysis shows that endogenous emotions (not brought about by the
treatment) may play a role in bid pricing but not at a significant level. While happiness
on an aggregate market level does seem to influence clearing price. Demographically,
females increases the bid/ask price and studying at post graduate level decreases it.
These results are generally indicative of countercyclical risk aversion in individuals.
Finally, Section 4.5 reviews the results of individuals’ predictions of clearing price. Find-
ing that individuals are better at predicting the clearing price in the subsequent round
in the boom condition than they are in the bust, which has a large negative forecast
deviation.
4.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics for the individuals and the orders they placed
from 16 experimental sessions. In total there were 157 participants split almost equally
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between the two treatments groups2. Females made up just under 40% of the partic-
ipants in both treatments, while those with English as a first language were equally
balanced. The average age in the treatments was 23 in both cases, and postgraduates
made up 25% of the subjects in the bust treatment and 32% in the boom treatment.
The summary statistics from the markets, in Table 4.2, show that in the boom treatment
there were more bids than asks, while the opposite was true in the bust treatment. The
average order price was higher in the boom treatment than it was in the bust, which
confirms the expectation that the bust condition will increase risk aversion as compared
to the boom condition.
Boom Bust p-value
Num. subjects 79 78
Female 38% 37% 0.91
Eng. Speaker 50% 49% 0.57
Postgraduate 25% 32% 0.17
Avg. Age 23.65 23.20 0.72
Avg. CTR 1.43 1.39 0.85
Avg. Payo↵ $32.25 $32.38 0.60
Table 4.1: Player Summary Statistics. The slightly higher payo↵ in the bust treatment
is accounted for by a di↵erence in payment for price prediction. Although market was
to have 16 subjects, ”no-shows” on the part of some participants required that one
session in the boom and two sessions in the bust be run with 15 participants each.
Boom Bust
Num. markets 10 9
Total orders 4740 4200
Buy Orders 1955 1645
Sell Orders 1866 1784
Hold Orders 919 807
Avg. Order Price 23.77 19.37
Table 4.2: Market Summary Statistics for each of the markets in the 10 sessions. One
market was dropped from the boom treatment as it was not able to be completed due
to time constraints. The average order price in the boom treatment was higher than
the average bust order price, indicating increased risk aversion in the bust markets.
To ensure that subjects have been su ciently randomized across the two treatment
conditions a randomisation check is performed using Mann-Whitney test (  2 tests for
binary variables). The p-value column in Table 4.1 gives the significance of each test.
2The data from market 30-2 was discarded as the market could not be completed due to time
constraints. This market had a bust treatment applied to it.
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Randomisation cannot be rejected for any of the reported demographics suggesting that
subjects are randomised across the treatments.
4.3 Markets
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the clearing price path for bust and boom treatments respec-
tively, with each panel corresponding to one 30 period market. Individual markets in
each of the treatment condition behaved broadly as expected.
Figure 4.1: Each panel is numbered with the session and then the market within
the session. The market clearing prices under the bust condition show a fairly flat
trajectory. Although markets 35-1 and 35-2 do show explosive price bubbles.
The figures generally illustrate depressed clearing prices in the bust condition, while
they appear to be more bubbly in the boom. With the exceptions of the final two
markets, 35-1 and 35-2, which exhibit explosive price bubbles3, the bust treatment shows
a reasonably flat price trajectory which tracks just above or below the fundamental value
of ECU14.00 for seven of the nine markets. The price trajectory in boommarkets appears
3These explosive bubbles are puzzling and a possible cause will be proposed in the discussion in the
next chapter.
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Figure 4.2: Each panel is numbered with the session and then the market within the
session. Market clearing prices under the boom condition tend to bubble above the
fundamental value of ECU14.00.
more volatile, trades at some distance from the fundamental value and tends to exhibit
a bubble and crash pattern which is associated with experimental asset markets. Also
of note is the double peak in the boom treatment, which occurs in four out of the 10
markets.
Based on the findings of other experimental asset market studies, it was expected that
there would be mispricing above the fundamental value in both the boom and the bust
treatment. Mispricing did occur, however Figure 4.3 reveals a clear di↵erence between
the two treatments, with the boom treatment clearing price tracking higher as compared
to the bust treatment. In addition, the mispricing seem to be of a longer duration in
the boom as compared to the bust.
Table 4.3 presents further interesting information on market behaviour. The average
clearing price and market volatility, as measured by standard deviation, is generally
lower in the bust treatments. However, markets 35-1 and 35-2 are the exception as
they exhibit very large standard deviations as compared to the remainder of the bust
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Figure 4.3: The market clearing price for the boom and bust conditions averaged over
each market trading period. The constant fundamental value is shown at ECU14.00.
This chart illustrates a clear di↵erence between the clearing price in the two groups.
treatments. This variance is representative of the explosive bubble that occurred in the
two markets and is at odds with the treatment. Nevertheless, based on the average
of the market in the two treatments, the boom markets had a clearing price ECU4.43
higher than the bust markets.
Observing the cumulative density function graph in Figure 4.4, there appears to be a
clear di↵erence in the location of the distribution of the boom and the bust groups.
To detect if this di↵erence is statistically significant, a Kolmogrorov-Smirnov test is
performed and a highly significant di↵erence is identified (z = 0.426, p = 0.000)4.
Next, the clearing prices are collapsed by market and a non-parametric Mann-Whitney
test is performed. This test finds that the average bids in the boom treatment are higher
than those in the bust (z= -1.80, p = 0.072). Markets within each session are checked
for di↵erence, however a Mann-Whitney test finds no di↵erence between the average
clearing price in market one and market two (z= 0.816, p = 0.414).
4The same test performed when the clearing price is averaged over the market does not give signifi-
cance(z = 0.455, p = 0.279).
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Treatment Market Avg. clearing price (Std Dev)
Bust 19-1 14.33 (2.09)
19-2 13.67 (1.14)
23-1 21.63 (2.27)
23-2 16.55 (3.92)
29-1 16.21 (1.68)
29-2 16.17 (1.66)
30-1 19.10 (0.99)
35-1 32.19 (17.60)
35-2 22.23 (11.10)
Avg. 19.12
Boom 17-1 20.64 (3.17)
17-2 18.66 (3.53)
26-1 22.81 (2.47)
26-2 16.40 (5.52)
27-1 18.31 (1.05)
27-2 21.30 (3.04)
31-1 23.65 (3.84)
31-2 30.42 (9.50)
34-1 40.90 (13.15)
34-2 36.99 (9.87)
Avg. 23.55
Table 4.3: Average clearing price per market.
The table reports the average clearing price and standard deviations for each market.
The markets are split between the boom and bust treatments. The market identifier is
made up of the session number and the market number within the session.
To understand what factors other than the treatment are involved in determining the
clearing price, a linear regression is undertaken using both ordinary leased squares (OLS)
and panel analysis. Given that each observation of the clearing price is likely to be de-
pendent on clearing prices in previous rounds, standard errors are corrected for clustering
by market in OLS and in the panel analysis, market is set to be the panel group. In the
model, learning between markets in the session is controlled by adding the market num-
ber (within the session). Market depth and liquidity are also controlled by adding the
number of bids and the number of transactions completed each round. The regression
model used is:
ClearingPrice = ↵+  1Boom+  2Market+  3Bids+  4Transactions+ ✏ (4.1)
Table 4.4 displays the results of this regression. The two treatment groups are denoted
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Figure 4.4: This figure shows the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of clearing
prices for the two treatments. There is a clear indication that the location, if not the
shape, of the CDF are di↵erent. A Kolmogrorov-Smirnov test confirms (z = 0.426, p
= 0.000).
OLS Panel
Boom 4.74 4.77
(2.57)* (2.61)*
Market -2.69 -2.62
(2.57) (2.59)
Bids -.43 -0.44
(0.18)** (0.15)***
Transactions 0.21 0.25
(0.36) (0.33)
Cons 26.2 22.23
(5.51)*** (3.29)***
Obs 570 570
R2 0.10
Table 4.4: Market Results
Clearing price is the dependent variable. OLS standard errors are clustered by 19
markets. Panel data is grouped on the market and uses an exchangeable correlation
structure. Standard errors marked with ***, ** and * are statistically significant at the
1%, 5% and 10% level respectively
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by the dummy variable Boom, which is 0 for the bust treatment and 1 for the boom
treatment. Market gives the market number within the sessions. It has values of either
1 or 2. Bids caters for market depth, with the parameters being the number of bids
made in a round. While Transactions gives the number of shares which were exchanged
each round.
Both OLS and panel analysis illustrate a significant di↵erence in the clearing price in
the treatments. The average clearing price in the boom is ECU4.74 (ECU4.77 in Panel)
higher than in the bust. The market number within the session is not statistically
significant (p=0.30) however the coe cient does reduce the clearing price, indicating
that learning about the state of nature is taking place in the second market. Market
depth in the form of the number of bids reduces the price. Indicating that when the
price is lower there is more interest in buying.
Result 1 (Market Results). Markets in both treatments tend to misprice, however those
in the boom treatment misprice to a greater degree than those in the bust treatment.
Although the second market in a session indicates a decrease in bubble size, it is not
statistically significant under OLS, panel or a Mann-Whitney test.
Mispricing
Table 4.5 provides the measures and the formulae used in this thesis to calculate the
asset mispricing from the fundamental value. Price amplitude (PA) measures the dif-
ference between the minimum and maximum deviation of the clearing prices from the
fundamental value in the market. Relative deviation (RD) averages the clearing price
deviation from the fundamental value in each round of a market. It give the average
overvaluation. Relative absolute deviation (RAD) is similar to RD except that it takes
the absolute deviation of the di↵erence between the price and the fundamental value.
Taking the absolute di↵erence prevents the prices below the fundamental value from
canceling out prices above the fundamental value. Finally, duration (DUR) gives the
average amount of time in rounds per market that the price stayed above the funda-
mental value. Duration is not strictly a mispricing measure but it is informative in
understanding the nature of the markets, especially when comparing treatments.
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Measure Formulae
Price Amplitude PA = maxPt FVtFVt  mint Pt FVtFVt
Relative Deviation RD = 1n
Pn
t=1
(Pt FVt)
FV
Relative Absolute Deviation RAD = 1n
Pn
t=1
|Pt FVt|
|FV |
Duration DUR = max(M : Pt   FV < Pt + 1  FV...
Pt+m   FV < Pt+m   FV )
Table 4.5: Mispricing measures and formulae for calculation
Using these measures, Table 4.6 provides the average mispricing for each of the treat-
ments. In all cases, the mispricing is lower in the bust treatment than the boom. Testing
the di↵erences between these averages using a Mann-Whitney test finds that PA, RD
and RAD are all significant at the 10% level and that DUR is significant at the 5% level.
PA RD RAD DUR
Bust 1.08 0.36 0.41 21.88
(1.19) (0.38) (0.38) (7.10)
Boom 1.34 0.68 0.69 27.5
(0.83) (0.42) (0.41) (4.59)
z-test -1.715* -1.80* -1.87* -2.07**
p-value 0.0864 0.0724 0.060 0.038
Table 4.6: Treatment averages for mispricing. Tests marked * and ** are statistically
significant at the 10% and 5% level respectively.
Result 2 (Mispricing). Mispricing and mispricing duration are greater in the boom
treatment than in the bust treatment.
4.4 Individuals
The results above show that there is a treatment e↵ect on the clearing price and the
mispricings in the market. They also identify that learning is taking place in the second
market of the session, although these variables are not statistically significant. These
variables are all brought about by the actions of individuals within the markets.
As there are multiple factors at play in individual decision making it can be di cult to
disentangle causality, especially so when applying statistical analysis to decision making.
Nevertheless this section attempts to identify if countercyclical risk aversion influences
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Figure 4.5: Frequency of the bid and ask order prices in each of the treatments. The
dashed line is the fundamental value of ECU14.00. These graphs indicate a clustering
around the fundamental value in bust treatment, but a more widely disbursed pattern
in the boom treatment.
the subjects to become more risk adverse and looks at which exogenous and endogenous
factors may be impacting individual risk preferences.
Figure 4.5 represents the frequency of bids and asks in each of the boom/bust treatments.
A clustering around the fundamental value of ECU14.00 can be observed in the bust
condition while there is greater variability in the boom. Table 4.7 details the average
bids and their standard deviations across all 19 markets broken down by treatment. Also
shown are the average bids, which are 25.55 in the boom and 20.42 in the bust. Testing
using a non-parametric Mann-Whitney test finds that this di↵erence is significant (z=
-1.87, p = 0.060), providing a clear suggestion that individuals are more risk adverse in
the bust treatment than they are in the boom. A Mann-Whitney test is performed to
check if there is a di↵erence between the average bids in market one and market two.
There is no statistical di↵erence between the average bids in the two markets (z= 0.572,
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Treatment Market Avg. Bid (Std Dev)
Bust 19-1 15.29 (2.42)
19-2 14.48 (1.57)
23-1 22.02 (2.99)
23-2 17.52 (4.44)
29-1 17.10 (2.12)
29-2 17.21 (2.33)
30-1 19.74 (1.64)
35-1 34.44 (18.24)
35-2 25.95 (13.51)
Avg. 20.42
Boom 17-1 22.61 (3.98)
17-2 19.86 (3.96)
26-1 24.06 (2.96)
26-2 18.20 (5.30)
27-1 18.36 (1.81)
27-2 21.54 (2.30)
31-1 25.07 (4.13)
31-2 32.78 (9.26)
34-1 40.90 (14.49)
34-2 30.96 (11.23)
Avg. 25.44
Table 4.7: Average bid per market. This table shows the average bid price (standard
deviation) for each market. The table is separated into treatments and gives the average
bid price in each of the treatments.
p = 0.568), indicating that learning between the two markets in each session cannot be
stated at any level of confidence.
Result 3. Individuals exhibit increased risk aversion in the bust treatment and decreased
risk aversion in the boom treatment across multiple investment decisions.
Emotions
To investigate if the characteristics or emotional states of individuals play a role in how
orders are placed in the market a linear regression model is constructed:
OrderPrice = ↵+  1Boom+  2Market+  3X + ✏ (4.2)
In this model, Order Price is the amount for which a bid or ask is placed. Boom is a
dummy variable in which 0 represents the bust treatment and 1 represents the boom
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OLS Panel OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bid Ask Bid Ask Clearing Price
Boom 4.64 5.34 4.00 5.60 4.57
(2.02)** (2.62)* (0.77)*** (1.03)*** (2.17)**
Market -1.95 -2.59 -2.00 -2.00 -3.24
(2.07) (2.67) (0.49)*** (0.48)*** (2.25)
Happiness 0.23 0.39 0.24 0.50 0.26
(0.21) (0.24) (0.31) (0.34) (0.14)*
Fear -.85 0.44 -0.60 0.15 -0.15
(0.53) (0.42) (0.49) (0.79) (0.21)
Stimulation -.04 0.29 0.11 0.15 0.13
(0.122) (0.14)** (0.24) (0.31) (0.10)
Dominance 0.17 -0.12 0.20 -0.10 -.07
(0.20) (0.19) (0.24) (0.38) (0.17)
Female 1.31 3.63 1.13 3.90 1.87
(0.70)* (1.28)** (0.95) (1.11)*** (0.75)**
Cash -.007 -.005 -.003 -.008 -.004
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.03)** (0.00)*** (.002)**
Age 0.09 0.12 0.02 0.05 0.09
(0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05)*
Risk 0.23 0.27 0.10 0.33 0.69
(0.24) (0.28) (0.24) (0.31) (0.17)
Speaker 0.35 1.45 0.10 0.33 0.91
(1.2) (1.38) (0.24) (0.31) (1.07)
Postgrad -1.30 -1.36 0.10 0.33 -0.78
(0.56)** (0.67)* (0.24) (0.31) (0.35)**
CRT -0.15 0.23 0.10 0.33 0.16
(0.31) (0.26) (0.24) (0.31) (0.18)
Cons 17.09 13.32 16.98 16.60 16.93
(3.31)*** (3.82)*** (3.26)*** (4.20)*** (2.69)***
Obs 3600 3614 3600 3614 8940
R2 0.11 0.12 0.10
Table 4.8: Individual results. Columns (1) and (2) provide estimates using OLS and
(3) and (4) using panel analysis where bid/ask price is the dependent variable. Column
(5) provides an OLS analysis where market clearing price is the dependent variable.
Standard errors for the OLS are clustered by market. The panel analysis is grouped by
individual. Standard errors marked with ***, ** and * are statistically significant at
the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively
treatment. Market is either 1 or 2, which represents the first or second market in a
session, and the X represents the other emotional and demographic variables.
Results of the regression via OLS and panel data analysis are shown in Table 4.8. Overall,
the estimation indicates that there is a treatment e↵ect for market participants. Subjects
in the boom treatment place orders for a higher value when compared to those in the bust
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treatment. Experience appears to reduce the average order price in the second market
of a session but not to statistically significant levels in the OLS analysis. Emotional
factors reported before the treatment do not appear to play a part in the higher order
pricing, nor does reflective thinking as measured by a CRT test.
Happiness, fear, stimulation and dominance all influence bid prices to a greater or lesser
degree, but not at a statistically significant level. Looking at the OLS bids in Table 4.8
it is clear that the self report of fear causes a decrease in the amount subjects are willing
to invest in the risky asset. Happiness, stimulation5 and dominance all increase the
amount they are willing to invest. None of these are significant at any standard levels,
but fear does approach them (t = 0.53, p = 0.142). It is also clear that stimulation
increases ask prices under the OLS regression (f = 4.59, p = 0.046).
Result 4. Emotional factors exogenous to the treatment do not have a statistically
significant e↵ect on the amount bid for the risky asset. However their coe cient does
indicate an impact consistent with their nature.
Although the above results identify that emotions do not have a statistically significant
impact on the individual bids, they may collectively a↵ect the clearing price in the
market. To test this intuition, an additional regression is constructed with clearing
price as the dependent variable. The result of this regression is shown in column (5) of
Table 4.8. This estimate reveals that average happiness does have a small and significant
influence on the clearing price of the market (f = 0.14, p = 0.067).
Result 5. The average level of happiness of a market has a positive change in the
clearing price of the risky asset.
4.5 Price predictions
At the end of each trading period participants were asked to predict the price of the
risky asset in the subsequent two rounds. They had ECU3.00 added to their total
experimental earnings at the end of the market for every prediction which was within
5Stimulation has a negative coe cient as a higher level of stimulation is represented by a lower
number.
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10% of the actual clearing price in the respective period. As can be seen in Table 4.9
those in the bust condition made ECU14.15 more on their predictions than those in the
boom (z-test -2.79, p-value = 0.005). While those in the bust condition did convincingly
better at predicting the clearing prices of the two subsequent rounds (t-test = 2.16,
p=0.02) (t-test = 1.94, p = 0.027).
These statistics, however, may provide an inaccurate picture of the individuals predic-
tive ability under the two treatments. The reason for this inaccuracy is that none of
those statistics focus on the predictions themselves. To investigate the accuracy of the
predicted price in the next round, a forecast bias (FB) (Eckel and Fu¨llbrunn, 2015) is
calculated as the di↵erence between the predicted price and the clearing price for each
subject averaged over the market. Those in the bust markets had a forecast bias of -1.10
while those in the boom markets had an average of 0.14, which is significantly di↵erent
using a Mann-Whitney test (z=-4.48, p = 0.000). So, while in the bust treatment is was
easier to get within 10% of the next rounds’ prices, and consequently make more money,
the predictions themselves had a large negative bias as compared to the predictions in
the boom treatment.
Prediction Earnings T+1 Correct T+2 Correct T+1 FB T+2 FB
Bust 112.46 4.17 3.53 -1.10 -0.45
(2.99) (0.52) (0.477) (1.97) (2.16)
Boom 98.31 2.26 2.27 0.14 -0.10
(3.48) (0.45) (0.43) (0.69) (1.53)
z-test -2.79*** -4.49*** -2.77***
t-test 2.16** 1.94**
p-value 0.005 0.016 0.027 0.0000 0.006
Table 4.9: Price predictions. Prediction earnings (Mann-Whitney test), exactly
correct predictions (t-test) and forecasts bias (Mann-Whitney test). Standard errors
marked with ***, ** and * are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level
respectively.
Result 6. Individuals in the bust condition are better at predicting the price of the asset
in subsequent rounds but they have a large and negative forecast bias.
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4.6 Demographics and CRT
There is a strong relationship between several demographic and control variables and
the bid price. Column (1) of Table 4.8 shows three interesting results. The first is that
postgraduate students place lower bids (and asks) than undergraduate students. Post-
graduates have a slightly lower CRT score than undergraduates (1.38 compared to 1.41)
so it is unlikely that they are any better (or worse) at reflecting on their decisions. They
are older, with a median age of 27.5 compared with 21 for undergraduates. However,
there is no evidence that age plays a significant role in order pricing. The second inter-
esting result is that females tend to place higher bid orders than males. The average
bid for males is ECU21.91 and the average for females is ECU23.64. The treatment
does not seem to have any impact on these numbers with females placing higher bids on
average in both treatments. Finally, the amount of cash held influenced the bid price
inversely. On average, for every ECU10.00 of cash held, the amount that was bid on
the risky asset reduced by ECU0.07. While this amount may not seem like a significant
amount, during the market participants could be holding up to ECU1000.00.
While CRT score did not seem to impact the amount bid on the risky asset, it did have
an e↵ect on the task related incentive. Those with a higher CRT had more ECU at
the end of each market and were able to more accurately predict the price of the asset
in subsequent rounds. Participants who did not correctly answer any CRT question
received an average of ECU680.78 for each market. For every CRT question correctly
answered subjects earned an additional ECU24.73 (t-test, p=0.026). In terms of total
pay o↵ the average for zero correct CRT was AUD26.40, with an additional AUD0.57
earned for each correct question.
Result 7. Some demographic and control variables did influence the bids in the market,
however they do not seem to bear any relationship to the treatment.
4.7 Conclusion
The results from the experimental asset market provide some clear answers to the key
research questions posed by this thesis. Traders do exhibit countercyclical risk aversion
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in experimental asset markets, both individually and collectively within the market.
Although the bust treatment does not, on average, cause the market to trade below the
fundamental value of the asset, it misprices the asset to a lesser degree than does the
boom treatment.
The same clear statements cannot be made about the role of emotions in risk taking.
There were no statistically significant findings in relation to happiness, fear, dominance
or stimulation a↵ecting bid prices for the risky asset. However, collective happiness
does appear to increase market clearing price. The most significant finding out of these
results seems to be that the bust group of markets individuals had negative perception
of the future price path of the asset, although that negative price path was not realised.
The next chapter will discuss the results outlined in this chapter in relation to other
findings in the literature and the implications of what has been found. Finally, it is
worth noting the outlier bust market 35-1 reduces the significance of all the findings in
this chapter. As it stands most of the tests conducted are statistically significant at the
10% level. If market 35-1 is removed from the analysis then the tests are significant at
the 1% level.
Chapter 5
Discussion
The experiment and results described in the previous two chapters attempt to simulate
the emotions that may cause habit based countercyclical risk aversion in an experimental
asset market. In this chapter the results of this experiment will be discussed in relation
to the market and the individual. The discussion will seek to relate the results to the key
research questions and investigate how they compare with other research in the area. In
addition, the implications of this work will be highlighted along with other explanations
for the results.
5.1 General discussion
The work of Campbell and Cochrane (1995), Constantinides (1990) and Verdelhan (2010)
highlight potential solutions to the equity premium puzzle. In their models, the risk aver-
sion of the individual agent varies over time. Specifically, there is an inverse relationship
between surplus consumption and risk aversion. As surplus consumption increases, risk
aversion decreases. Here, surplus consumption refers to the di↵erence between actual
consumption and a habit level of consumption variously defined as the average level
of consumption, in the economy (Campbell and Cochrane, 1995; Verdelhan, 2010) or
previous personal consumption Constantinides (1990). The aim of this thesis is not to
define the nature of theoretical habit but to examine if there is a behavioural basis for
it.
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Many models of utility assume that individuals have a constant level of risk aversion.
However, Cesarini et al. (2009) find that genetics explains only around 20% of risk
preference, with the remainder being explained by environmental factors. When the
environment changes it is possible that so does risk aversion. This point is argued by
Cameron and Shah (2015) who suggest that individuals who had lived through natural
disasters, both recent and historic had increased risk aversion in financial decision mak-
ing; And by Malmendier and Nagel (2009) who present a similar finding in individuals
who have experienced economic recession.
The findings presented in Chapter 4 are consistent with a variable level of risk aversion.
In the experimental sessions, the decreased market bubble and reduced mispricings are
solid evidence that priming the market in a financial contraction increases overall risk
aversion resulting in generally flatter asset price trajectories. The duration of mispricing
was also significantly shorter in the bust at 73% of the market compared to 91% in the
boom. Duration was the most statistically significant of all the mispricing measures at
5%, as compared to 10% for price amplitude, relative deviation and relative absolute
deviation.
These findings agree with Cohn et al. (2015)’s investigation into countercyclical risk
aversion. Using an identical priming treatment, they found that individuals in the
bust treatment invested 22% less in the risky asset than those in the boom. Although
the results are not directly comparable due to di↵erences in the investment task, the
current study finds the average bid price is 20% less in the bust treatment. While it
may be a coincidence that these two percentages are quite similar, it does illustrate
that individuals primed in a market bust scenario are more risk adverse, which provides
support for the notion of countercyclical risk aversion.
Kuhnen (2015) speculates that this type of countercyclical risk aversion may be at-
tributed to a pessimism bias which is driven by a change in subjective belief during times
of scarcity. This notion is similar to Routledge and Zin (2010) who develop model of
utility and risk preference which contains a generalised disappointment aversion (GDA).
Their model places emphasis on negative unexpected outcomes by overweighting tail
risk, which causes variations in the price of risk.
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The concept of pessimism bias and GDA sit nicely with the results of this study. Relative
deviation, which represents the average deviation between the fundamental value of the
asset and the clearing price was 32% lower in the bust treatment. The di↵erence between
the relative deviation in the boom and the bust treatment, indicates that those in the
bust treatment are much less willing to invest in the risky asset and drive up the price.
This suggests that they have a pessimistic belief that they will not be able to make money
through speculation on the price of the asset or, in the view of GDA, the wish to avoid
disappointment in the event of a crash in the price of the asset. The results around
relative aversion appears to corroborate the findings of Andrade et al. (2015). Their
experimental asset market has treatments of excitement and fear, which are induced
by having the participants watch clips of exciting or frightening movies respectively.
As with this study, they report bubbles in both the fear and excitement treatment.
In an additional consistency between the two studies, they find that excitement and
fear produce a statistically significant di↵erence in relative deviation between the two
treatment groups. In their study the di↵erence is 39%, which is similar to the 32%
di↵erence in this study.
Comparison between the two studies is interesting given the nature of the treatments.
There is much literature which reconciles the concepts of boom and bust with excitement
and fear (De Long et al., 1990; Campbell and Cochrane, 2000; Shiller, 1990; Peterson,
2007). The similarities between the findings of this thesis and Andrade et al. (2015) gives
cautious support to the idea that emotions are involved in influencing risk preference in
general, and in countercyclical risk aversion specifically.
The suggestion that emotions have an influence on asset prices can trace its foundations
to Kahneman and Tversky’s work on heuristics and prospect theory. Heuristics are
“rules of thumb” which individuals commonly use as a quick and not fully cognitive
or rational method of making decisions. The seminal work by Tversky and Kahneman
(1973) on heuristics, judgment and decision making describes how and why individuals
may not act completely rationally when making a financial decision. As a follow up,
Kahneman and Tversky (1979)’s prospect theory critiques expected utility theory. They
provide a model which acknowledges the role of emotions and identifies decision making
as reference dependent and concerned with short term outcomes. Building on these
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and the work of Simon (1955), Kahneman (2003) proposed maps of bounded rationality
which split decision making into two systems: intuitive and reasoning. When intuitive
reasoning is employed, emotions tend to influence decisions to a greater degree than
rationality.
In this experiment, measures of emotion are taken before the treatment. The result,
when measured against bid price and the market clearing price, indicates that elevated
happiness, dominance and stimulation increase the amount bid, while elevated fear de-
creases it. These results are not statistically significant for bids, but they do move in
the direction consistent with the nature of the emotion. Specifically, confidence and
excitement increase risk taking and fear decreases it. There are two notable signs of this
influence in the results. The first is that as levels of fear increase, the amount bid on the
risky asset decreases by ECU0.85 per level of fear reported by the individual1. While
the second is that the collective level of happiness in a market increases its clearing price
by a statistically significant ECU0.23 per level of reported happiness.
The each level of fear reported2 in this study, decreases individual bid prices bid price
by 4.6%. In their study, Cohn et al. (2015)’s self reports of fear decreases investment
in a risky asset by 5% for each level of fear. While these numbers cannot be directly
compared due to scale factors and di↵erences in the investment task, there is symmetry
between the two statistics which highlights that fear, irrespective of its origins, does
decrease the propensity for risk taking.
These results agree with the findings of other studies in the area of emotion and risk
taking. Lo et al. (2005) find that emotions such as fear have a primary role in risk taking,
and Lejarraga et al. (2016) find that individuals who have a negative market learning
experience are more risk adverse than those who have a positive one. Furthermore,
Schlo¨sser et al. (2013) identify high levels of happiness, dominance and stimulation as
recorded on self assessment mannequins identical to the ones used in this study, increase
the likelihood of choosing a risky financial option over a safe one.
As a cause of this emotive behaviour, Lo et al. (2005) suggest that automatic emo-
tional responses often “short-circuit” the logical decision making functions of the brain.
1This decrease is a significant amount when compared to the amount changed by the treatment.
2Fear is report on a five point Likert scale
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Research in the area of neuro-economics may hint at the underlying mechanism which
causes the di↵erence between the treatment groups. Several experiments study emo-
tions and risk taking in experimental asset markets and in other settings, and provide
evidence of this “short-circuit”.
From a neuro-financial perspective, Kuhnen and Knutson (2011b) identify the nucleus
accumbens (NAcc) and anterior insular as the areas of the brain which control risk
taking and risk aversion, respectively, and suggest that activation in these areas predicts
risk taking or risk aversive behaviour. In a study that confirms the link between these
brain regions and risk preference, Smith et al. (2014) uses brain imaging techniques
in an experimental asset market to show that the rise of market bubbles tracks NAcc
activation, and the start of a crash is predicted by activation of the anterior insular.
Perhaps the above findings can illustrate the abnormally large bubbles of markets 35-1
and 35-2 (Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4) in this study . The outcome of these bust markets
was surprising, as the familiar boom/bust pattern observed bears little resemblance to
the flat price trajectories in the other markets in the bust treatment. A possible cause
of this response is a positive feedback loop (De Long et al., 1990), brought about by
excitement from perceived profits in a market with rising prices. This excitement is
reinforced by reward messages from the NAcc, which increase the bubble each round.
Risk aversion then takes control through the activation of the anterior insular and the
market crashes.
A complementary finding comes from neuro-biology. In a study of market traders, Coates
and Herbert (2008) find levels of testosterone build, and risk taking increases, as trades
are made and profits identified. This self reinforcing cycle drives the bubble up until it
is unsustainable and eventually crashes. Conversely, they identify stress caused by the
hormone cortisol increases risk aversion and drives the price down. It is possible that
this situation is occurring in the experimental asset market. However it is unlikely that
cortisol is having an e↵ect in the experimental setting as it is generally thought that it is
levels of cortisol built up over a number of days which induce the increased risk aversion
(Kandasamy et al., 2014).
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An interesting finding which builds more support for the countercyclical nature of risk
aversion, and hints at its underlying neurological basis, is the negative forecast bias of
markets in the bust group. The prediction of next round prices varied between the two
groups by 1.24, with the boom group having a positive forecast bias just above zero at
0.14, and the bust group having a larger negative bias at -1.1. This negative value in the
bust treatment is indicative of a collective activation of the ateriour insular which may
cause an increased risk aversion in the market. There is an expectation on at least part
of the market that prices should be going down, even if this decrease does not eventuate.
Finally, (Campbell and Cochrane, 1995) very clearly posit an emotional cause for coun-
tercyclical risk aversion. In their consumption utility model, the fear of a recession
during an economic downturn increases risk aversion and investors demand a high risk
premium because of this fear. “Habit persistence can explain why recessions are so
feared, even though their e↵ects on output are small relative to a few years’ growth”
Campbell and Cochrane (2000):208.
Demographics and controls
Although not relevant to the key research questions in all cases, there were several
unexpected findings from the results. The first is that females make significantly higher
bids for the risky asset than males do. This finding is contradictory to most research in
the area of risk aversion and gender di↵erences (Deaves et al., 2008; Eckel and Fu¨llbrunn,
2015; Sjo¨berg and Engelberg, 2009). Female bids for the risky asset were, on average,
ECU1.31 higher than male bids. It is di cult to explain this result with any degree of
confidence as further data analysis does not shed any light on it. Research by Olsen
and Cox (2001) suggests that females are most concerned about the possibility of loss
and ambiguity in asset and portfolio choice. It is therefore possible to speculate that
females did not identify with either of these two attributes of risk in this experimental
asset market task.
A second variable worthy of mention, as it has the potential to tell a story, is the amount
of cash held. The relationship between the amount of cash held and the amount bid
for the risky asset is an inverse one. For every ECU100.00 held a participant will, on
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average, bid ECU0.70 less for the risky asset. While this decrease may be taken as a sign
of a concave utility function it may also represent the situation that towards the end of
the market participants generally have more cash and the price of the stock is moving
back towards the fundamental value. The only statistical evidence that that provides
illumination on this subject is that if the model in Chapter 4 equation 4.2 is estimated
separately for each of the treatments; the cash holdings result is no longer significant in
the boom but still highly significant in the bust. This finding suggests that risk aversion
in the bust treatment is causing heightened interest in holding cash.
Finally, both Noussair et al. (2016) and Corgnet et al. (2015) find that the sophistica-
tion of individual traders as measured by a cognitive reflection test (CRT) impacts the
amount of price deviation from asset fundamental values. They find that the greater the
sophistication the less the mispricing in the market. Similar to this experiment, they
find that traders with higher CRT scores are likely to have higher overall earnings. How-
ever, in contrast to those studies, this study does not find any di↵erence in mispricing
in markets that had a higher average CRT.
5.2 Alternate explanations
Throughout this chapter it has been argued that there is clear evidence that individuals
in the bust treatment bid less for the risky asset than they do in the boom, due to
countercyclical risk aversion. However, it could also be argued that the treatment is
not a↵ecting risk aversion, but rather changing the subjective expectations that capital
gains can be made through speculation.
Cohn et al. (2015) use an identical treatment to investigate if there is a change in risk
aversion in one o↵ lotteries. They find very similar results to this thesis. The note that
Based on this lack of ability to speculate in their study, it is not unreasonable to conclude
that the boom/bust treatment specifically acts on the individual’s risk aversion.
To address the explanation from a di↵erent perspective, I investigate the Walrasian
supply and demand determination of price. If price expectations are exogenous to the
price formation process (Plott and Sunder, 1982) and therfore formed based on prior
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information, in this case the priming, then the start of the boom may be caused by an
expectation of speculative gain. To check this explanation, I estimate a model for the
intertemporal behaviour of observed prices from Smith et al. (1988):
Pt   Pt 1 =  E(d) +K +  (Bt 1  Ot 1) (5.1)
In this model the change in price from one period to another is made up of: the decline
in expected dividend3 E(d) ; The risk factor K; and the demand for shares arising from
capital gains. When this model is estimated separately for the treatments, the boom
gives a statistically significant positive coe cient of 0.23 (f = 5.61, p = 0.018). For
the bust, the coe cient is 0.036 and not statistically significant from 0 (f = 0.58, p =
0.44). This result suggests that there is an expectation of speculative gain in the boom
treatment but not in the bust4.
The above notion is supported by Porter and Smith (1995), who identify initial risk
aversion and then a capital gains motivation in their experimental asset markets. The
bubbles may be caused by De Long et al. (1990) positive feedback trading, initiated by
noise traders and then taken up by ration traders, who buy the share for more than its
fundamental value with a speculative motive because they anticipate that they will be
able to resell it for more than it’s worth5.
Although there is evidence to believe that the treatment is causing a change in risk
preference, it is not conclusive. A combination of factors may be driving price. Perhaps
the lower bid prices in the bust treatment are caused by increased risk aversion. While
the boom treatment may alter risk aversion so the decision becomes one of whether
to speculate or not to speculate. Once again this can be related to a neuro-economic
explanation which suggests that activation of the anterior insular increases risk aversion
in the bust treatment and the NAcc is causing speculation in the boom. Based on these
factors there is a strong argument that the treatment acted on risk aversion, and those
3Which in this experiment is 0.
4This estimation was done excluding the outlier markets 35-1 and 35-2, as in these markets there is
a clear expectation of speculative gain.
5This model is similar to one by Harrison and Kreps (1978) in which traders pay a “speculation
premium” because they expect capital gains.
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with capital gains expectations had such expectations tempered in the bust markets as
compared to the boom markets.
5.3 Significance and implications
The findings of this thesis have significance at the individual and market level. On the
part of the individual it has been shown that risk aversion will change given di↵erent
environmental situations, and that this change is most likely brought about by emo-
tions encroaching on logical decision making in a financial setting. These findings may
assist others in the development of models of utility which take into account emotive
environmental factors.
From a market perspective, showing that environmental factors such as the notion of
stock market boom or bust can collectively change investment behaviour increases our
understanding of how real world markets may act or react in similar environmental
situations. Underinvestment in the factors of production due to excessive risk aversion
will have a negative consequence for economies and individuals alike. By understanding
how and why excessive collective risk aversion occurs, future research may be able to
identify methods of reducing its impact.
Finally, by providing support for financial models which include behavioural elements of
risk aversion, it may assist with the development of new asset pricing models. Models
which adequately represent how markets are operating are more likely to enhance their
predictive value.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
Understanding the way in which people behave when making financial decisions is im-
portant, particularly in theoretical modeling. While the utility maximising Bayesian
updating rational agents who inhabit many economic models are useful, the introduc-
tion of behavioural traits to their attributes provide the opportunity to reflect actual
states of nature. Institutions and policy makers alike can particularly benefit from
knowledge of the likely impact of environmental factors on the behaviour of individuals
and groups.
This thesis provides an insight into this behaviour and the influence that business cycles
and emotions may have on risk aversion. As emotionally driven risk aversion may lead
to underinvestment, not only in the capital markets but also in human capital, it is an
important area of research.
Specifically, this study sets out to determine if there is a behavioural basis for models
of asset pricing which contain habit and countercyclical risk aversion. To achieve this
goal, a number of experimental asset markets were conducted in which the subjects
were primed in either a financial boom or a financial bust. Individual and market data
was collected and statistically analysed to understand if the priming treatment caused
a change in behaviour.
The results from the analysis paint an interesting picture of the interaction between
environment, individual and market. The priming of the individuals in a stock market
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boom or bust caused an observable change in behaviour. Those primed in the bust bid
less for the risky asset, which had an obvious knock-on e↵ect in the market, causing the
asset to trade at a significantly depressed price as compared to the boom treatment. It
was also significant that average price forecasts of those in the bust were well below the
price path tracked by the asset, indicating that there was an expectation of a depressed
price.
The mental conceptualisation of positive or negative stock market events seemingly
changes an individual’s disposition to take risk. Emotions produced by this concep-
tualisation are implicit in this change. In the experimental markets, fear predicted a
decreased investment on the risky asset, while collective market happiness increased
the price at which the asset traded. While these emotions and their underlying neuro-
biology were exogenous to the treatment, there is a clear link between boom and bust;
happiness and fear.
Taken together, the findings of this analysis point to an emotive behavioural basis for
countercyclical risk aversion. This implication supports models of asset pricing contain-
ing a habit based utility function, which may be useful in helping to solve the equity
premium puzzle.
I specifically answer the key research questions as follows:
Key Research Question 1. Do individuals collectively exhibit countercyclical risk
aversion in an experimental asset market?
I find that individuals primed in a financial contraction place lower bids than those
primed in a financial expansion. Further, I find that markets in the bust treatment
bubble less and that mispricing of the asset as against its fundamental value is reduced
in the bust treatment as compared to those in the boom treatment. This evidence leads
to the conclusion that individuals do exhibit countercyclical risk aversion in experimental
asset markets.
Key Research Question 2. Do emotions in general, and fear specifically, influence
risk taking in experimental asset markets? If so, what are the neuro-biological mecha-
nisms which underlie them?
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I find that fear is implicated in increased risk aversion and that happiness leads to in-
creased risk taking. Furthermore, these two emotions are likely to work in tandem to
produce countercyclical risk aversion. Based on the work of others it is possible to specu-
late that specific brain regions work together to mediate excess risk taking and aversion.
If there are environmental factors causing one of these regions to take precedence over
the other in a group of people collectively undertaking financial decisions, then financial
instability may result.
This research, like any other, is not without its limitations. Similar to many behavioural
economics and finance experiments, it is di cult to claim high external validity of the
experiment. Although the findings are relevant to real world situations, the experimental
asset market does not simulate the depth and breadth of real world markets, but nor
does it try to. The experimental asset market is simply a vehicle for observing how
groups of individuals collectively make financial decisions.
The experiment uses exogenous treatment to simulate the boom and the bust. To more
correctly induce the emotion that would be invoked during a boom or bust, it may
be better to simulate them within the actual market. However this alternative may
produce a more acute reaction to loss or gain as opposed to the long-term nature of
business cycles.
In addition, the current study does not provide any experimental evidence on the neuro-
biological states of the traders. While valid speculation based on other studies is pro-
vided, brain activity is not measured. Due to the di culties and costs of obtaining
bio-metric technology, I rely on the findings of others undertaking very similar or rele-
vant experiments.
In terms of internal validity, there are several points which, if addressed, may provide
additional or di↵erent results. For example, the experiment has no baseline as there is
no control treatment group. It would be useful to have a control state where neither a
boom nor a bust treatment is applied. This control would enable better understanding
of the treatment e↵ect. In addition, there is no chance of actual loss in the market as
the subjects are given ”house money”, which may cause them to behave in a di↵erent
manner as compared to investing money which was earned in the experiment. Finally,
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self assessment mannequins (SAMs) were the instruments used to capture emotions.
Although widely used in psychology, they may not be an adequate measure to correctly
identify how the subjects are feeling.
In spite of the above issues, the evidence gathered from the experiment provides a
useful insight into the behavioural aspects of financial decision making in individuals
and suggests a number of additional avenues of research.
Further work is required to establish the extent to which peer e↵ects could increase the
contagion of a market boom or bust. It is known that peer e↵ects significantly influence
risk aversion, implying that social interaction in stock market activity may well induce
or increase concepts such as feedback loops and herding.
Time pressure may also play a role in inducing an individual to react, not to the facts
but rather to their emotions. It has often been observed that decisions made under low
time pressure lead to a better quality of decision. It would be interesting to observe
if time pressure caused a larger decrease (increase) of asset price in the bust (boom).
However, there is also the possibility that time pressure will simply cause excitement
and result in larger asset price bubbles in both treatments.
Finally, the nature of the graphs which are used for priming in the experiment could
be utilised as a treatment. Altering the appearance of the graphs to indicate if the
price changes are long or short term in nature may change the behaviour of market
participants. It is conceivable that those primed with a short term “boom” graph
may generate larger bubbles than those primed with a long term “boom”. Conversely,
participants primed with a long term “bust” graph may be less risk adverse than those
primed with a short term graph. This may potentially achieve a clearer and more
e↵ective prime to the participants.
Appendix A
Instructions
In this experiment you will be playing a stock market game. Your aim is to make money
by deciding when is the right time to buy or sell shares. At the beginning of the game
you will be given 100 CASH, measured in Experimental Currency Units (ECU), and 6
shares of STOCK. You can increase the number of shares that you hold by buying them
with your CASH. And you can increase your CASH by selling STOCK. You will also
increase your CASH holdings through interest earned on your CASH and the dividend
paid by each share of STOCK that you hold.
Game Play
There will be two markets, which you will play one after the other. At the beginning of
each market the STOCK price and the shares of STOCK and CASH that you have will
revert to their starting values. Each markets consists of 30 rounds. During each round
you will be able to buy or sell one share of STOCK. A market price (share price) will
be calculated each round. The market price will be the price at which the most shares
in the market can be bought and sold. The market price will then be used to match
buyers and sellers. Buyers who placed an order at the market price or above will be
matched with sellers who placed an order at the market price or below. At the end of
each market your STOCK will traded in for ECU14.00.
At the end of the game one of the two markets that you have played will be selected
at random and the CASH and STOCK that you had at the end of that market will
70
Appendix A 71
be converted to real money at the rate of $3.00 to every ECU 100.00 of experimental
currency. So, for example, if you had ECU 650 at the end of the selected market, you
would receive $19.50 plus your show up fee of $5.00
CASH and STOCK
The STOCK is a risky asset and will change in value depending on market supply and
demand. It will pay a dividend of either ECU 0.40 or ECU 1.00 per share per round,
with an even chance of each. So, for example if you had 10 shares of STOCK at the end
of a round and the dividend payout for the round was ECU 1.00 you would receive ECU
10.00 in CASH for the round. If the dividend payout for the round was ECU 0.40, you
would receive ECU 4.00 in CASH.
Cash is a riskless asset and will not increase or decrease in value. It pays a fixed interest
rate of 5% per round. So, for example if you finished a round with ECU 100 in CASH
you would receive ECU 5.00 interest.
At the end of each round you will be asked to guess the price of the STOCK for the
next two rounds. For each guess, if you are with in 10% of the actual stock price you
will receive ECU 3.00. This will be added to you total experimental currency earnings
at the end of the market.
Appendix B
Software screen shots
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Figure B.1: Instructions. Game instructions. The instructions were red on the screen.
Participants were given five minutes to read through the instruction before being asked
to move onto the next screen
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Figure B.2: Introduction. The introduction is presented once during the experiment.
It is a gateway screen and is not displayed until all subjects in the session have clicked
on the next button on the instruction screen. This screen captures no data.
Figure B.3: Arousal SAM. Emotional self report of how stimulated or emotionally
aroused the subject is feeling. The slider, with seven positions, below the pictured is
used to indicated stimulation level.
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Figure B.4: Dominance SAM. Emotional self report of how dominant the subject is
feeling. Dominance represents how in control of the current environment the individ-
ual feels. The slider below the pictured has seven positions and is used to indicated
dominance level.
Figure B.5: Happiness SAM. Emotional self report of how happy the subject is feeling.
This emotion can also relate to general pleasure level or valance that the individual feels.
The slider below the pictured has seven positions and is used to indicated happiness.
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Figure B.6: Self report of fear. A five level Likert scale for the subject to choose their
perceived level of fear.
Figure B.7: Cognitive reflection test. The cognitive reflection test(CRT) measures the
ability of an individual to think about a question rather than answering it intuitively.
Each question has an intuitive but wrong answer and a correct answer which is clear
once the question is pondered further.
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Figure B.8: Treatment screens. Depending on the treatment for the session par-
ticipants were either shown shown the fictive graph of an economic contract or and
economic expansion. Subjects were asked a number of questions about this type of
economic state to prim them with the feeling that they were in that type of situation.
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Figure B.9: Market Start. Informs the subjects that the market is aboout to start.
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Figure B.10: Order placement. The Order Screen is the main screen used for trading.
Participants could buy or sell stock if they had enough cash or stock to do so. Leverage
and short selling was not permitted. The graph at the bottom of the screen provides a
visual indication of the price of the stock in previous rounds.
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Figure B.11: Results - Order not matched. The Results screen indicates if a purchase
or sale was successful along with the total number of transactions in the period.
Figure B.12: Results - Held. The Results screen indicates if a purchase or sale was
successful along with the total number of transactions in the period.
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Figure B.13: Results - Sold. The Results screen indicates if a purchase or sale was
successful along with the total number of transactions in the period.
Figure B.14: Results - Bought. The Results screen indicates if a purchase or sale was
successful along with the total number of transactions in the period.
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Figure B.15: Dividends and Interest. The Dividend and Interest screen provides the
traders with the returns on cash and shares for the period. It also gives them the state
of nature for the share dividend.
Figure B.16: Price Predictions. The Prediction screen asks the subjects to predict
the clearing price in the subsequent two rounds.
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Figure B.17: Market Over. This screen informs the subjects that the market is
completed and the amount of cash in ECU that they have earned. This screen is
displayed once at the end of market one and once at the end of market two.
Figure B.18: Final Market. This screen is displayed when both markets in a session
are completed.
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Figure B.19: Game Earning. The subjects are informed which of the two rounds
their earnings will come from, as well as the amount that they have earned.
Figure B.20: Demographics. The subjected are asked to complete a number of de-
mographics questions while their payment is being processed.
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Figure B.21: The End.
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